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STOCK EQUIPMENT FOR THE BARGAIN IN
FACT: TRADE USAGE, "EXPRESS TERMS,"
AND CONSISTENCY UNDER SECTION
1-205 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODEt
AMY H. KASTELYt"
The Uniform Commercial Code (Code) treats trade usage as an
essential element of agreements, reflecting the true understanding of the
parties. Section 1-205(4) of the Code requires that trade usage and the
express terms of an agreement be construed as consistent whenever rea-
sonable, but when such a construction is unreasonable, express terms
control usages of trade. In this Article, Professor Kastely examines and
evaluates the various approaches courts have adopted in interpreting sec-
tion 1-205(4). After reviewing the policies underlying the Code's treat-
ment of trade usage, Professor Kastely suggests an interpretive approach
to section 1-205(4) that would further the intent of the Code's drafters to
make trade usage binding in most cases. Under Professor Kastely's pro-
posal, courts construing agreements containing written terms in conflict
with trade usage would be required to give effect to the usage unless the
parties expressly agreed not to follow it. The Article concludes with a
response to two major criticisms of the Code's treatment of trade usage
and a defense of section 1-205(4).
The Uniform Commercial Code has reformed the law governing commer-
cial transactions in numerous ways. Some changes were obvious and immedi-
ate,1 while others were more subtle and have been slower to take effect.
Numerous provisions in Articles 1 and 2 made fundamental changes merely by
reformulating or refining traditional doctrine concerning the creation and con-
tent of contractual obligations.2 As these provisions structure debate within spe-
t "The point is this, too trite to be remembered: Unless the stock intellectual equipment is
apt, it takes extra art or intuition to get proper results with it. Whereas if the stock intellectual
equipment is apt, it takes extra ineptitude to get sad results with it." Llewellyn, The First Struggle to
Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. REv. 873, 876 (1939) (emphasis omitted).
tt Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii.
B.A. 1973, University of Chicago; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago. I am grateful for support on
this project from the University of Hawaii Research Council and the William S. Richardson School
of Law. I thank John Honnold and Addison Bowman for their helpful comments, Jane Takata for
her skillful secretarial work, and, especially, Joyce McCarty for her excellent assistance and sus-
taining friendship. Finally, I thank J. Kastely, whose ideas and insights have enriched every aspect
of my work.
1. Upon adoption of the Code, for example, each state established a unified system for regis-
tering security interests in personal property, and firm offers between merchants became binding
without consideration. See U.C.C. §§ 9-401, 2-205 (1978). See generally Mentschikoff, Highlights of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MOD. L. REv. 167 (1964) (discussing important innovations in
the Code).
2. Numerous articles have explored this aspect of the Code. Three that are particularly help-
ful are Casebeer, Escape from Liberalism: Fact and Value in Karl Llewellyn, 1977 DUKE L.J. 671;
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cific disputes, they reorient the way we think and talk about contractual
obligations.
One of the most significant changes effected by the Code is the treatment of
trade usage as an actual part of agreements.3 Under pre-Code doctrine, the
common practices of a particular trade were used primarily to define specific
technical terms4 or to fill in "gaps" left by the parties' agreement.5 If the parties
had failed to agree on a particular matter, courts would use trade usage to sup-
Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621
(1975); and Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 OR. L.
REV. 269 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism]. Other interesting arti-
cles on this general topic include Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of which Karl N Llewellyn is the Hero
of the Piece; or Searching for More Expansive Joints in Karl's Crumbling Cathedral Indus., 12 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 139 (1970); Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330 (1951); Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code"Methodol-
ogy, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291; King, The New Conceptualism of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 30 (1965); McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795 (1978); Mooney, Old Kontract Princi-
pies and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L.
REv. 213 (1966); Murphy, Facilitation and Regulation in the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 625 (1966); Murray, The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Murray, Philosophy of
Article 2]; Speidel, Contract Law: Some Reflections Upon Commercial Context and the Judicial Pro-
cess, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 822; and Warren, Formal and Operative Rules Under Common Law and
Code, 30 UCLA L. REV. 898 (1983).
3. U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1978) provides: "[A]ny usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which
[the parties] are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give[s] particular meaning to and
supplement[s] or qualif[ies] terms of an agreement." For discussion of the importance of this sec-
tion, see Carroll, supra note 2, at 155-77; Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales: Should It
Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 822, 827-29 (1950); Furnish, Custom as a Source of Law, 30 AM. J.
COMP. L. 31, 38-42 (Supp. 1982); Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the
UCC Theory, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 811; Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101 (1965); Mentschikoff, supra note 1, at 168-
70; and Mooney, supra note 2, at 250-53.
4. See, eg., Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 141 Or. 306, 310-11, 16 P.2d 627, 629 (1932) ("Thus
one is justified in saying that the language of the dictionaries is not the only language spoken in
America."); Distillers Distrib. Corp. v. Sherwood Distilling Co., 180 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1950);
Denker v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 56 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1932); Gumbinsky Bros. v. Smal-
ley, 203 A.D. 661, 197 N.Y.S. 530 (1922), afl'd, 235 N.Y. 619, 139 N.E. 758 (1923); RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS §§ 235(b), 246 comment a (1932); 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 555, at 228-39
(1960); 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 650 (rev. ed. 1936).
5. See, e-g., California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474, 482, 289
P.2d 785, 790 (1955) ("It is the general rule that ... evidence of usage is always admissible to
supply a deficiency .... ); Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Grays Harbor Exportation Co,, 106 F.2d 911
(9th Cir. 1939); J.B. Lyon & Co. v. Culbertson, Blair & Co., 83 Ill. 33 (1876); Homix Prods., Inc. v.
Henry Pape, Inc., 274 A.D. 648, 86 N.Y.S.2d 648, aff'd, 299 N.Y. 773, 87 N.E.2d 687 (1949); see
also Backus & Harfield, Custom and Letters of Credit: The Dixon, Irmaos Case, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 589, 602 (1952) ("It is the function of custom to fill in the interstices of an agreement, to
reduce the burdens of making written memoranda of agreement, and to substitute for agreement
with respect to matters overlooked or not expressly foreseen."). As one student commentator
observed:
Courts may ... permit the introduction of evidence demonstrating that the parties at-
tached a meaning to the terms of their contract dissimilar to that generally attributable to
such phrases or symbols. Alternatively proof of usage may be admitted to serve an intersti-
tial function in order to complete the terms of an agreement intended by the parties but not
fully articulated on the face of the contract.
Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its Application to Commercial Dealings and the Common Law, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1195 (1955); cf. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law 445-48 (1958) (unpublished manuscript available at the
Harvard Law School) (discussing custom as filling gaps in the general law).
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plement the contract.6 Although courts justified this practice on the theory that
"the parties knew of the usage and contracted with reference to it,"'7 they none-
theless treated trade usage as extrinsic to the agreement itself.8 Under this pre-
Code practice, courts viewed the parties' language and conduct as the essence of
their agreement and relied on trade usage only if the actual agreement lacked
clarity or specificity.
The Code changed this approach by treating trade usage9 as an essential
part of the "agreement." 10 Section 1-205 provides that the "true understand-
ing"1 1 of the parties is reflected in trade usage,12 as well as in the parties' Ian-
6. The Uniform Sales Act included the following provision:
Variation of Implied Obligations. Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a
contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express
agreement or by course of dealing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such
as to bind both parties to the contract or the sale.
UNIF. SALES ACT § 71 (1906). This section was interpreted to allow trade usage to supplement a
contract when the parties' language did not address a particular matter. See, eg., La Nasa v. Russell
Packing Co., 198 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1952).
7. Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 390 (1871); see Hostetter v. Park, 137 U.S. 30
(1890); Nicoll v. Pittsvein Coal Co., 269 F. 968, 971 (2d Cir. 1920); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.
Co., 83 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Pa. 1949); Fisher v. Congregation B'nai Yitzhok, 177 Pa. Super. 359,
110 A.2d 881 (1955); 1 W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 17, at 9-10 (M.
Bigelow 5th ed. 1874).
8. See Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 833,
848-52 (1964); infra note 23 and accompanying text.
9. "Usage of trade" is defined by U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1978):
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance
in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect
to the transaction in question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as
facts.
It is significant that this definition speaks of "any practice or method of dealing" and not merely of a
trade meaning for specific words.
10. Under U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1978), "'[a]greement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as
found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or
usage oftrade or course of performance as provided in this Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208)." An
earlier version of this section provided: "'Agreed' or 'Agreement' means the bargain [of the parties]
in fact as found in the language of the parties or in course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance or by implication from other circumstances." U.C.C. § 1-201(2) (1949), reprinted in 6
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTs 32 (E. Kelly comp. 1984).
The current language was adopted in 1956 with the explanation that "[t]he changes leave the
effect of course of dealing and the like to other provisions such as Section 1-205." AMERICAN LAW
INST. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 13, reprinted in 18 UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE DRAFTS, supra, at 37 [hereinafter cited as 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS]. It is clear
that no substantive change was intended. Although the New York Law Revision Commission com-
mented that the original version might have been too broad in its definition of "agreement," this
criticism was directed primarily at U.C.C. § 1-205 (1952). NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION
COMM'N, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Legis. Doc. No. 65(B), at 84-86 (1955). The
Editorial Board apparently did not accept the view of the New York State Law Revision Commis-
sion because no change was made to § 1-205, and no reference was made to the New York Commis-
sion Report. 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 13. See Mooney, supra note 2, at 228; cf. Luedtke
Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 592 F. Supp. 75, 79 (S.D. Ind. 1983) ("Thus, the Code supplies
a sales agreement with much that is not made express by the parties."), aff'd, 740 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.
1984); Personal Fin. Co. v. Meredith, 39 Ill. App. 3d 695, 702, 350 N.E.2d 781, 789 (1976) ('[T]he
language of the contract is not controlling as to the parties' 'agreement.' ").
11. See U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 (1978) ("Paragraph (a) makes admissible evidence of...
usage of trade. . . in order that the true understanding of the parties as to the agreement may be
reached."); cf. American Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353 N.W.2d 592, 597
(Minn. App. 1984) ("The trend has been for judges, looking beyond written contract terms to reach
19861
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guage and conduct.13 This "true understanding" or "expectation" is the
primary source of contractual obligation under Article 2.14
This conception of trade usage reinforces other Code provisions that inter-
pret contract obligations by reference to commercial practices and standards.' 5
The Code embodies the beliefs that the reasonable1 6 practices and standards of
the commercial community are an appropriate source of legal obligation and
that these practices create actual expectations which should be given full effect
in the law. 17 The treatment of trade usage as a part of the agreement in section
1-205 provides a foundation for these principles.
18
The shift from viewing trade usage as a point of reference in filling gaps to
regarding it as part of the agreement itself is not problematic. Contract doctrine
has long held that liability may be based on something other than an express
promise. 19 Courts and commentators have traditionally spoken of "intentions"
the 'true understanding' of the parties to extend themselves to reconcile trade usage and course of
dealing with seemingly contradictory express terms.").
12. U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1978); see supra note 3 (text of provision); see also U.C.C. § 1-205 com-
ment 4 (1978) ("Part of the agreement of the parties. . . is to be sought for in the usages of trade
which furnish the background and give particular meaning to the language used, and are the frame-
work of common understanding."). See generally Hawldand, Sales Contract Terms Under the UCC,
17 U.C.C. L.J. 195, 198 (1985) (trade usage is part of the agreement itself under the Code); Murray,
Philosophy ofArticle 2, supra note 2, at 14-15 (trade usage is one important "non-language manifes-
tation" of agreement under the Code).
13. To accept this conception is not to deny the argument, made by several scholars, that using
trade usage to define contractual obligations undermines the notion that such obligations are purely
private. See P. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUcTION TO THE LAV OF CONTRACT 182 (3d ed., 1981); M.
HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 188-201 (1977); Farnsworth,
Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860 (1968); cf 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 4,
§ 556, at 243-44 (trade usage is used both for interpretation and construction of contracts). This
conception does, however, lead one to conclude that trade usage cannot be viewed as a solely exter-
nal source of obligation and that the relationship between public and private sources of obligation is
more complex than some have suggested. See infra notes 224-41 and accompanying text.
14. Under the Code, the initial basis for contractual obligation is "agreement," and "agree-
ment" includes both explicit and implicit expectations of the parties. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 2-301
(1978); authorities cited supra note 10.
15. See, eg., U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1978) ("good faith"); id. § 1-204(2) ("reasonable time"); id.
§ 2-305(1) ("reasonable price"); id. § 2-311(1) (specification "within limits set by commercial
reasonableness").
16. Section 1-205 indicates that only "reasonable" trade usages are binding. For a discussion of
this issue, see infra notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
17. See Carroll, supra note 2, at 156-67; Danzig, supra note 2, at 627-31; Mooney, supra note 2,
at 224-29, 250-53; Murray, Philosophy of Article 2, supra note 2, at 14-16; cf Farnsworth, Good
Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U.
CHI. L. REv. 666, 671-78 (1963) (discussing the commercial reasonableness of good faith under the
Code).
18. Section 1-205 also governs the effect of course of dealing, but this Article will focus exclu-
sively on trade usage because of its key role in the jurisprudence of the Code and contract law. See
generally Danzig, supra note 2, at 629-31 (discussing the importance of commercial practice in the
Code); Mooney, supra note 2, at 250-53 (emphasizing the role of § 1-205 in Code jurisprudence);
Murray, Philosophy ofArticle 2, supra note 2, at 14-16 (discussing trade usage in the Code). Courts
generally have treated course of dealing and trade usage cases similarly under § 1-205. See, e.g.,
Budget Sys. v. Seifert Pontiac, Inc., 40 Colo. App. 406, 579 P.2d 87 (1978).
19. See generally P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 149-51, 483-
84 (1979) (discussing 18th and 19th century ideas regarding implied promises); E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS, § 3.10, at 124 (1982) ("Conduct that would lead a reasonable person in the other
party's position to infer a promise in return for performance or promise may amount to an offer."):
M. HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 170-73 (discussing 18th century views of express and implied con-
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and "expectations" as sources for defining the obligations imposed by a con-
tract.20 Although it would be hard to say that a specific buyer or seller actually
promised to comply with trade usage-if by "promise" we mean the communica-
tion of a binding intention to do a certain act2 I-it is quite easy to conceive that
both parties expected that the normal practice would be followed. The reasoning
behind section 1-205 is straightforward: if a contract can be defined by shared
expectations, 22 and if those expectations were created by trade usage, then the
contract should be defined by trade usage.
This new conception of trade usage, however, makes it more difficult to
determine the content of any particular agreement. If trade usage is treated as
direct evidence of the parties' agreement, how should it be weighed against other
evidence of shared expectations, such as the parties' words or conduct? This
question becomes more pointed when the parties' oral or written communica-
tions suggest that they did not intend to follow a particular trade usage. Under
pre-Code doctrine, resolving this problem was simple: trade usage was signifi-
cant only if there was a gap in the parties' explicit communications. If the lan-
guage appeared to cover a particular issue, there was no need to consider trade
usage in connection with that issue.
23
Under the Code, however, trade usage cannot be so easily dismissed.2 4 Sec-
tracts); cf. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981) (exploring the breadth and limits of the prom-
ise principle).
20. See, eg., J. CHrTY, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 73-74 (1851); 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 4,
§ 534; 4 W. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2022 (2d ed. 1920); Reiter & Swan, Contracts and
the Protection of Reasonable Expectations, in STuDIEs IN CONTRACT LAW 1, 6-8 (B. Reiter & J.
Swan eds. 1980).
21. See generally C. FRIED, supra note 19, at 7-17 (discussing the meaning of "promise").
22. Those who urged adoption of the Code emphasized the idea that the law should give effect
to the parties' expectations. See, eg., Davenport, The Code Approach and Sources of Law, 44 NEB.
L. REv. 362, 375 (1965) ("The result in pre-Code sales law was more frequently to defeat the reason-
able expectations of businessmen than it was to fulfill those expectations. So the draftsmen of the
Code proceeded on the premise that Article 2 should fulfill those reasonable expectations, not defeat
them."). See generally Murray, Philosophy ofArticle 2, supra note 2, at 17 (the Code's definition of
"bargain" includes all reasonable expectations, even as to matters not consciously considered at the
time of the initial agreement).
23. Indeed, many courts held that trade usage was subject to exclusion as extrinsic evidence
under the common-law parol evidence rule. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. May, 311 F.2d 117,
119 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 930 (1963); Ehlinger v. Washburn-Wilson Seed Co., 51
Idaho 17, 19-20, 1 P.2d 188, 189 (1931); Booher v. Williams, 341 Ill. App. 504, 511, 95 N.E.2d 518,
521 (1950); cf. R.L. Rothstein Corp. v. Kerr S.S. Co., 21 A.D.2d 463, 467, 251 N.Y.S.2d 81, 84
(1964) (existence of a written term makes evidence of trade usage immaterial), aft'd, 15 N.Y.2d 897,
206 N.E.2d 360, 258 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1965).
24. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978) provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of
their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted
by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be
explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of perform-
ance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to
have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement.
Under the Code, evidence of trade usage is admissible even if the parties intended to have a fully
integrated writing. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 805 (9th
1986"]
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tion 1-205(4) requires the trier of fact in a contract dispute to analyze conflicts
between trade usage and other types of evidence in accordance with the follow-
ing standard: "The express terms of an agreement and an applicable. . . usage
of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other;
but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control. . . usage of
trade."'2 5 This provision introduces new concepts and formulations without
much explanation or explicit guidance and has proved troublesome. Indeed,
courts have interpreted this section in conflicting ways, disagreeing about its
basic meaning and function.
This Article explains the difficulty courts have had in interpreting section 1-
205(4) and develops an alternative interpretive approach that gives effect to the
Code's doctrinal changes and orientation toward commercial practice. Part I of
the Article reviews judicial interpretations of section 1-205(4) and focuses on the
influence of the parol evidence rule. Part II evaluates these interpretations and
suggests an alternative view of section 1-205(4). The Article then discusses two
major criticisms of the Code's treatment of trade usage and offers a partial de-
fense of section 1-205.
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 1-205(4)
In numerous cases, courts have relied on section 1-205(4) to evaluate the
scope and meaning of contract terms and to resolve apparent conflicts between
the parties' language and normal trade practices. In several early cases, courts
sought to determine the parties' actual expectations without regard to whether
those expectations were created by language or by trade practice.2 6 Although
no consistent interpretation emerged from these early cases, the courts' flexible
approach was in keeping with the statutory purpose of section 1-205(4). More
recent decisions, because of the influence of the parol evidence rule, have given
undue priority to written terms, 27 and this trend has confused the basic meaning
and function of section 1-205(4).28
Cir. 1981); Peoples Bank & Trust v. Reiff, 256 N.W.2d 336, 341 (N.D. 1977); Raney v. Uvalde
Producers Wool & Mohair Co., 571 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). But see Morgan v.
Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 801, 808, 663 P.2d 1384, 1388-89 (1983) (dicta suggesting
that trade usage is not admissible to supplement a fully integrated writing); J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 85 (2d ed. 1980) (trade usage evidence is excludable under
§ 2-202 if it contradicts written terms); Hawkland, supra note 12, at 208-14 (§ 2-202 excludes some
trade usage evidence). See generally Kirst, supra note 3, at 832-36 (arguing that trade usage evidence
is not subject to exclusion under § 2-202); Murray, Philosophy ofArticle 2, supra note 2, at 16 ("No
matter how final and complete the writing, no matter how fully integrated, this. . . evidence [trade
usage, course of dealing, and course of performance] is always admissible."); Wallach, The Declining
"Sanctity" of Written Contracts-Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol Evidence
Rule, 44 Mo. L. Rnv. 651, 665 (1979) ("Under the Code, parol evidence includes only prior oral and
written agreements, and contemporaneous oral agreements.").
25. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1978).
26. See infra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 71-117 and accompanying text.
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A. Flexibility in Several Early Cases
As the drafters of the Code observed, "[t]he principle offreedom of bargain
is a principle of freedom of intended bargain. It requires what the parties' [sic]
have bargained out to stand as the parties shaped it, subject only to certain over-
riding rules of public policy."'29 How, then, can trade usage, which the parties
have not shaped by themselves, ever be given greater weight than the parties'
own language? In several early cases, courts found that even though the parties
had adopted a written term that appeared to conflict with particular trade prac-
tices, they actually expected to comply with the trade usage. Assuming these
decisions were correct, there are two possible reasons that the courts gave prior-
ity to trade usage over the language of the parties. First, the parties might not
have actually agreed to the written term, even though it was included in the
documents. Second, the parties might have understood the written term30 to
mean something quite different from its ordinary usage. In either of these situa-
tions, the trade usage would be a more accurate reflection of the parties' actual
expectations than the written term.
In Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton,31 the first major
case decided under section 1-205(4), a bank sued an automobile dealer, Prusky,
for enforcement of a surety agreement executed in connection with an auto loan
to one of Prusky's customers, Ms. Pemberton.32 As part of the arrangement,
Ms. Pemberton had purchased insurance on the automobile for fire, theft, and
collision. When the insurance policy was cancelled, only the bank was noti-
fied, 33 and it did not inform Prusky, the surety, of the cancellation. After the
car was severely damaged in an accident, Ms. Pemberton defaulted on the loan,
and the bank sought payment from Prusky. In defense, Prusky argued that the
bank had violated its obligation, based on trade usage, to notify him that the
insurance policy had been cancelled. 34 The bank responded by citing a term in
the surety agreement that purported to waive "all notices whatsoever in respect
to this Agreement."
3 5
29. REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT, THE REVISED SALES AcT 52 (1941) (Comment 3 to § l-C),
reprinted in I UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS, supra note 10, at 269, 332 [hereinafter cited
as REVISED SALES ACT, SECOND DRAFT]. This draft, including the comments, was approved by
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in September 1941. Id. at 281.
30. This proposition might also be true of an oral term because spoken words may carry a
special meaning to one in the trade. The discussion in this Article focuses on apparent conflicts
between trade usage and written terms because the most difficult questions arise in this area. Section
1-205(4), however, applies equally to oral and written terms.
31. 196 Pa. Super. 180, 173 A.2d 780, aff'g per curiam 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 720, 173 A.2d 780
(1961) (The trial judge's opinion was reprinted at 173 A.2d 780, following the opinion of the superior
court.).
32. The Bank alleged (1) that an unusual procedure was used because Ms. Pemberton was a
bad credit risk, (2) that Prusky's guarantee was given in his individual capacity, and (3) that the
trade usage applicable to "dealer transactions" therefore did not apply. The trial court rejected these
arguments. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 720, 723, 173
A.2d 780, 783 (1961).
33. The policy apparently was cancelled for nonpayment of a premium. The Bank received
notice because it was named as the "loss payee" in the policy. Id. at 722, 728, 173 A.2d at 782, 784.
34. Prusky argued that if he had been notified of the cancellation, he could have arranged
alternative protection for himself. Id. at 723, 173 A.2d at 781.
35. Id. at 728, 173 A.2d at 782.
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The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the bank was obligated to give
notice, despite the written term, in accordance with the normal trade practice.
3 6
Relying on sections 1-205(2) and 2-202(a), 37 the court evaluated all the evidence
to determine the parties' actual understandings and expectations. The court
concluded that the trade usage justified Prusky's expectation that the bank
would notify him of any cancellation of the insurance and that the "no notice"
term in the surety agreement did not in itself change that expectation.38 The
court noted that the written term was merely part of a standard printed form
and that it did not even refer to the normal notification practice.
39
The Pemberton decision thus recognized the actual expectations of the par-
ties, without concern for whether those expectations were more accurately re-
flected by the trade usage or by the written agreement. The court either believed
that the parties did not actually intend to follow the "no notice" clause or that
they did not mean for the clause to refer to the kind of notice at issue in the case.
The Law Division of the New Jersey Superior Court adopted a similar ap-
proach in Gindy Manufacturing Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp.40 Cardinale
purchased twenty-five new semi-trailers from Gindy. After delivery, Cardinale
claimed that there were defects in the equipment. In response to Cardinale's
claim, Gindy cited clauses in the standard form contract providing that the
buyer took each vehicle "as is" and that the agreement included no warranties. 4 1
Cardinale alleged, however, that the normal practice in the industry was for the
seller of new vehicles to repair or to compensate for all manufacturing defects.
42
Relying on section 1-205, the court held that trade usage could be used to deter-
mine the actual agreement of the parties.4 3 The court indicated that the trier of
fact should consider how the "as is" clause was normally used and understood
by those in the trade.4 4 In this way the trier could focus directly on the normal
expectations created by the specific terms of the form contract. The court con-
cluded that a reasonable member of the trade could have understood the "no
warranties" clause to apply only to the sale of used vehicles. Furthermore, in
the court's view, a reasonable member of the trade might not have viewed the
36. Id. at 728-29, 173 A.2d at 784.
37. See supra notes 9, 24 (text of cited provisions).
38. The court reasoned that the "no notice" clause referred only to parts of the agreement other
than those concerning insurance. Pemberton, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d at 728, 173 A.2d at 784. The dissent
argued that the "explicit language" of the document should be given "its literal meaning."
Pemberton, 196 Pa. Super. at 182, 173 A.2d at 781 (Flood, J., dissenting).
39. The court relied on U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 (1978): "'Unless carefully negated [usages
of trade and courses of dealing] have become an element of the words used.'" Pemberton, 24 Pa. D.
& C.2d at 728, 173 A.2d at 784 (emphasis added). For a discussion of this comment, see infra text
accompanying notes 88-89.
40. 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (Law Div. 1970).
41. Id. at 386, 268 A.2d at 349.
42. Cardinale also alleged that the parties had followed this normal industry practice in their
prior course of dealing and in the course of performance of the contract at issue in the case. Id.; see
U.C.C. § 2-208 (1978) (course of performance).
43. Gindy Mfg., II N.J. Super. at 389, 268 A.2d at 349. The court also relied on U.C.C. § 2-
314(3) (1978), which provides that "other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or
usage of trade." Gindy Mfg., 111 N.J. Super. at 389, 395, 268 A.2d at 349, 352.
44. Gindy Mfg., IlI N.J. Super. at 397, 268 A.2d at 353. The court therefore denied Gindy's
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 399, 268 A.2d at 354.
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"as is" clause as relieving the seller of its obligation to deliver the trailers in good
condition. The court found that if these constructions reflected the actual mean-
ing of the clauses, there would be no inconsistency between the express terms
and the trade usage under section 1-205(4).4
5
In another relatively early case, Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Securalloy
Co.,46 the contract in dispute called for delivery of "500 Gross Tons" of stainless
steel solids. The defendant delivered only 210 tons. Despite the written term,
the court allowed the jury to determine whether the parties had actually ex-
pected to follow the normal trade practice of allowing the seller to deliver less
than the specified amount.47
In these early decisions4 8 the courts focused on the parties' actual expecta-
tions as reflected by trade usage, but also gave appropriate weight to the parties'
language and to their actual understanding of written terms. These courts ac-
cepted the idea that trade usage is normally a significant part of an agreement,
and they were willing to critically examine written terms that appeared to mod-
ify trade usages.
B. The Influence of the Parol Evidence Rule
The flexible approach of the early cases was all but lost in later decisions as
courts turned to the parol evidence rule for guidance in interpreting section 1-
205(4). At common law, evidence of trade usage generally was treated like any
other extrinsic evidence excludable under the parol evidence rule.49 It is not
surprising, therefore, that courts eventually used the parol evidence rule for gui-
dance in interpreting section 1-205(4).50 Unfortunately, reliance on the parol
evidence rule brought confusion and complication rather than clarity. In effect,
this analytical approach reinstituted the pre-Code conception of trade usage as
extrinsic to agreements and thereby undermined much of the innovation of sec-
tion 1-205.
The first case5 1 directly linking section 1-205(4) to the parol evidence rule
was Division of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp. 52 Mobil terminated
45. Id.
46. 312 F. Supp. 801 (D. Conn. 1970).
47. Id. at 804. Securalloy argued that those in the stainless steel trade actually understood the
quantity term to be a mere estimate.
48. In addition to the cases discussed supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text, see Chase
Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1046-48 (5th Cir. 1971) (trade usage may
show that a written term was not actually agreed to or that it had a special meaning to the parties).
49. See cases cited supra note 23.
50. Some courts may have seen similarities between § 1-205(4) and the parol evidence rule of
U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978) because both provisions use the word "consistent." As discussed in Part II,
however, this term has quite different significance in the two sections. See infra notes 190-201 and
accompanying text. Moreover, key differences in the two sections outweigh the slight similarity
arising from the use of the term "consistent." Most importantly, the parol evidence rule's require-
ment of a "final" writing is not a prerequisite to the application of § 1-205(4).
51. One earlier case suggested such a connection, but did not rely on it. See Miron v. Yonkers
Raceway, 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing Chase Manhattan Bank v. May, 311 F.2d 117 (3d Cir.
1962)).
52. 60 Misc. 2d. 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1969), afld mem., 34 A.D. 618, 311 N.Y.S.2d
961 (1970).
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Triple T's service station franchise 53 pursuant to a term in the written contract
that allowed either party to terminate upon ninety days' notice. Triple T argued
that the trade practice under contracts with similar language allowed termina-
tion only if the franchisee seriously failed in its duties. Triple T further alleged
that both parties had expected such a limitation to apply to the contract at issue
in the case.
54
The trial court rejected Triple T's argument and held that evidence of the
alleged trade usage would not be admissible at trial:
[T]he Code itself codifies the well established rule in the law of con-
tracts that evidence of custom or usage in the trade is not admissible
where inconsistent with the express terms of the contract (Uniform
Commercial Code Sec. 1-205(4). . . ). At bar the express terms of the
contract cover the entire area of termination and negate plaintiff's ar-
gument that the custom or usage in the trade implicitly adds the words
"with cause" in the termination clause. . . . The contracts are unam-
biguous and no sufficient basis appears for a construction which would
insert words to limit the effect of the termination clause. Only lan-
guage consistent with the tenor of the otherwise complete agreement is
admissible under the guise of "custom and usage" and the Code effects
no change in that doctrine. 5"
The court equated section 1-205(4) with the parol evidence rule and implicitly
assumed that admissibility under section 1-205 would depend on the same test of
"consistency" that is used to evaluate evidence of explicit communications be-
tween the parties under the parol evidence rule.
56
The analogy between section 1-205(4) and the parol evidence rule gained
the influential approval of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co. 57 The court of appeals inter-
preted section 1-205(4) as follows: "There can be no doubt that the Uniform
Commercial Code restates the well established rule that evidence of usage of
trade . . . should be excluded whenever it cannot be reasonably construed as
consistent with the terms of the contract."58 Although concluding that section
1-205(4) restates the parol evidence rule concerning trade usage,5 9 the court
broadly defined the term "consistency" 60 and held that the evidence of trade
usage in the case should have been admitted. 6 1 Nevertheless, by endorsing the
analogy between section 1-205(4) and the parol evidence rule, the Columbia Ni-
53. Mobil apparently wanted to use the land occupied by the Triple T franchise for a different
purpose. Id. at 722, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
54. Id. at 730-31, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
55. Id. at 731, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
56. Id.
57. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). The written term in dispute in Columbia Nitrogen stated that
the buyer would purchase at least 31,000 tons of phosphate during each of three years. The alleged
trade usage treated such terms as mere estimates, not binding on either side. Id. at 6-7.
58. Id. at 9 (citing Division of Triple T Serv., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (Sup. Ct.
1969)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 9-10.
61. Id. at 11.
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trogen decision considerably skewed the function of section 1-205(4).62
It is regrettable that this interpretation of section 1-205(4) has been widely
followed. Section 1-205(4) is not written as a parol evidence rule. It does not
purport to require the exclusion of evidence, and unlike the parol evidence rule,
section 1-205(4) does not require a final writing as a prerequisite to its applica-
tion.63 Moreover, the purpose of section 1-205(4) differs greatly from that of the
parol evidence rule. Doctrine developed under the parol evidence rule is
designed to give priority to written terms and to devalue other evidence of the
parties' intentions.64 Section 1-205, in contrast, is designed to give full effect to
trade usage as a reflection of the "true understanding" of the parties.
65
The mistaken analogy between section 1-205(4) and the parol evidence rule
has confused interpretation of section 1-205(4) in three significant ways. First, it
has led courts to exclude evidence of trade usage, rather than to evaluate it along
with other evidence.66 Second, it has suggested to courts that section 1-205(4)
was designed to protect written documents against evidence that does not appear
in those documents. 67 Last, it has encouraged courts to analyze written terms
separately from other evidence, as if written terms should be interpreted first in
isolation and then compared to nonwritten evidence.68 The result of this confu-
sion has been a failure to give sufficient weight to trade usage in interpreting
many contracts.
Following Columbia Nitrogen, most courts have viewed section 1-205(4) as
a "quasi parol evidence rule" that requires the exclusion of trade usage evidence
if it is "inconsistent" with written terms.6 9 This view has focused doctrinal de-
bate on the definition of "consistency." Although a few courts have been willing
62. See Kirst, supra note 3, at 843-56. But see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 85
(concluding that § 1-205(4) requires the exclusion of inconsistent evidence).
63. Compare U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1978) ("express terms of an agreement") with id. § 2-202
("Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are other-
wise set forth in a writing intended by theparties as afinal expression of their agreement with respect
to such terms as are included therein. . . .") (emphasis added).
64. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 7.2, at 447-51 (discussing the rationale of
the parol evidence rule); Wallach, supra note 24, at 653-54 (discussing policies behind U.C.C. § 2-
202).
65. In effect, the Code gives priority to written terms with respect to evidence of prior negotia-
tions or agreements but not with respect to evidence of trade usage. This distinction makes good
sense. When parties adopt a final writing they most often intend it to be "the last word" on their
negotiations, but they do not normally intend to renounce all accepted trade practices. See U.C.C.
§ 1-205 comment 1 (1978) ("The measure and background for interpretation are set by the commer-
cial context, which may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.").
Moreover, evidence of prior negotiations and oral agreements is often unreliable; evidence of trade
usage, in contrast, is objectively verifiable. See Kirst, supra note 3, at 838-39; cf. 5 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 4, § 654 (written documents may be contradicted more extensively by trade usage than by
parol agreements).
66. See generally Kirst, supra note 3, at 869 (characterizing this interpretation as the "false
parol evidence rule" of § 1-205(4)).
67. See infra notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 172-89 and accompanying text.
69. See, eg., Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 1980);
Carter Baron Drilling v. Badger Oil Corp., 581 F. Supp. 592, 595 (D. Colo. 1984) ("Thus § 4-1-
205(4) has assumed the role of a quasi-parol evidence rule for evidence of usage of trade. ); see
also infra notes 71-117 and accompanying text (discussing cases decided under the "quasi-parol
evidence rule" interpretation of § 1-205(4)).
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to treat section 1-205(4) as a rule of construction and not a rule excluding evi-
dence, even these courts have been influenced by the parol evidence rule to give
undue deference to written terms.
70
1. An Expansive Definition of Consistency: "Total Negation"
Treating section 1-205(4) as a "quasi parol evidence rule" clearly conflicts
with the drafters' intent to give "full scope" 7 1 to trade usage. One way to lessen
this conflict is to admit trade usage as "consistent" with written terms under a
very expansive definition of consistency. A line of cases adopting this approach
has found a trade usage to be "consistent" with a written term so long as it does
not "totally negate" the written term.
A leading case adopting the "total negation" standard is Nanakuli Paving &
Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co.,72 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld a finding that the written price term in an asphalt supply
contract was qualified by a trade practice requiring suppliers to delay price in-
creases for jobs on which the paving company had already bid.73 Following a
scholarly review of cases and other authorities, the court correctly concluded
that section 1-205(4) did not preclude the jury from giving effect to the trade
practice, even though it contradicted an explicit price term. 74 The court's ra-
tionale supporting this conclusion, however, is strained and unpersuasive:
Here, the express price term was "Shell's Posted Price at time of deliv-
ery." A total negation of that term would be that the buyer was to set
the price. It is a less than complete negation of the term that an un-
stated exception exists at times of price increases, at which times the
old price is to be charged, for a certain period or for a specified ton-
nage, on work already committed at the lower price on nonescalating
contracts. Such a usage forms a broad and important exception to the
70. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
71. See REvISED SALES Acr, SECOND DRAFr, supra note 29, at 335 (comment on section I-D)
("[T]he policy ...of giving to usage as full a scope as reason will permit, is the only sound
policy.").
72. 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981). For cases supporting the total negation interpretation, see
Sunbury Textile Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1978); Columbia Nitrogen
Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Securalloy Co., 312
F. Supp. 801 (D. Conn. 1970); Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 59 Cal.
App. 3d 948, 131 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1976); American Mach. & Tool v. Strite-Anderson Mfg., 353
N.W.2d 592 (Minn. App. 1984); Modine Mfg. Co. v. North East Indep. School Dist., 503 S.W.2d
833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
73. Nanakuli Paving, 664 F.2d at 779-80. The court explained this practice of "price protec-
tion" as follows:
Price protection was practiced in the asphaltic paving trade by either extending the
old price for a period of time after a new one went into effect or charging the old price for a
specified tonnage, which represented work committed at the old price. In addition, several
months' advance notice was given of price increases.
Id. at 778 n.4.
74. Id. at 805. In the alternative, the court held that Shell's failure to follow the practice of
price protection might have constituted a breach of its obligation to set its price in good faith under
U.C.C. §§ 2-305(2), 2-103(1)(b) (1978). Nanakuli Paving, 664 F.2d at 805-06. The court of appeals
reversed the district court's order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed that
judgment be entered in accordance with the jury's verdict for Nanakuli. Id. at 806.
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express term, but does not swallow it entirely.75
In other words, under the reasoning of Nanakuli Paving, trade usage may qual-
ify an express term so long as it does not totally negate that term. Following this
analysis, the court in Nanakuli Paving found that the term "Shell's posted price"
could be qualified by any trade usage except one that allowed Nanakuli to set the
price. Because the trade usage of price protection did not permit the buyer to set
the price, the court held that the trade usage could modify the written price
term.
Although the court in Nanakuli Paving was certainly correct in admitting
the evidence of trade usage and although the jury may have been right in its
interpretation of the parties' expectations, the case failed to provide a logical
approach for analyzing problems that arise under section 1-205(4). The total
negation standard the court adopted is essentially a meaningless test. In the
Nanakuli Paving dispute, it is obvious that trade usage would not permit the
buyer to set the price; such an arrangement would be practically senseless. Yet,
if the test for inconsistency under section 1-205(4) is total negation, as the
Nanakuli Paving court suggested, then it is no real test at all because a trade
usage will almost never constitute a total negation of a written term.
The artificiality of the total negation test is also apparent in Carter Baron
Drilling v. Badger Oil Corp.,76 in which a written term of the contract in dispute
stated that the "operator [would] pay contractor" specified amounts for work
done on an oil well. 77 The working interest in the well was owned by a third
party, Knee Hill Energy, Inc., which had hired Badger Oil to operate the well.
Carter Baron, the contractor, was aware of this arrangement. Knee Hill failed
to pay Badger, Badger withheld payment from Carter Baron, and Carter Baron
sued Badger, claiming that Badger was obligated to pay under the express term
of the contract.7 8 In defense, Badger presented evidence that the normal prac-
tice in the oil and gas industry was for the owner of the working interest to be
primarily responsible for payment of operating debts, even if the operator had
signed a service or supplies agreement.
79
The court examined the conflict between the express term and the alleged
trade usage and concluded that the trade usage did not entirely negate the ex-
press term: "A complete negation of this term ["operator shall pay contractor"]
is 'operator shall not pay contractor.' It is merely a qualification of the term to
say 'operator shall pay contractor unless operator is not himself paid by the
working interest owners.' "80 As in Nanakuli Paving, this rationale simply is not
adequate to justify the conclusion that the written term should not control over
the trade usage. It may be that the parties in Carter Baron expected to follow
75. Nanakuli Paving, 664 F.2d at 805 (emphasis added).
76. 581 F. Supp. 592 (D. Colo. 1984).
77. The contract identified Badger Oil as the "operator" and Carter Baron as the "contractor."
Id. at 593.
78. Id. at 593-94.
79. Id. at 599.
80. Id. The court cited Nanakuli Paving as authority for the total negation test. Carter Baron,
581 F. Supp. at 599.
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the trade practice and that the writing did not alter this expectation, but the
court's analysis did not reach those issues. Instead, the court purported to de-
termine whether the trade usage was "consistent" with the written term. Be-
cause the trade usage did not provide that the operator would never pay the
contractor, the Carter Baron court held that the trade usage could modify the
written term. The court's reasoning that trade usage is relevant to understand-
ing the terms of the contract solely because it fails to totally negate the express
terms of the contract is unconvincing.
The doctrine is inadequate when courts are forced to justify good results
with artificial analysis. An analysis such as the total negation test adopted in
Nanakuli Paving and Carter Baron makes the law appear arbitrary; and because
the law finally is not arbitrary, some courts will refuse to adopt the analysis and
consequently will fail to accord trade usage the significant role it should play in
defining the terms of agreements.
The notion of total negation derives from two separate doctrinal sources.
One is a line of cases that broadly construes the requirement of consistency
under the parol evidence rule.8 1 In the leading case, Hunt Foods & Industries,
Inc. v. Dolimer,82 the court held that an additional oral term is consistent within
the meaning of the parol evidence rule unless it completely negates the written
terms: "To be inconsistent the term must contradict or negate a term of the
writing. A term or condition which has a lesser effect is provable." a8 3 In Hunt
Foods the written terms provided an option to buy, and an alleged oral agree-
ment specified the conditions under which the option could be exercised. The
court held that the alleged oral agreement did not "negate" the written term and
therefore that the evidence of its existence was admissible.
84
Regardless of the value of the Hunt Foods test under the parol evidence
rule, 85 it is totally inappropriate for the evaluation of trade usage. The total
negation test inverts the correct relationship between trade usage and express
terms under section 1-205(4). The crucial issue in determining whether trade
81. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Dolimer, 26 A.D.2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966), was cited
in Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801, 804 n.4 (D. Conn. 1981), to
support the exclusion of evidence relating to an alleged oral agreement. Michael Schiavone was cited
in Modine Mfg. Co. v. North East Indep. School Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973),
in support of the proposition that trade usage is admissible unless it totally negates the written terms.
All three decisions were cited in Nanakuli Paving, 664 F.2d at 797, 801-02.
82. 26 A.D.2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966).
83. Id. at 43, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 940. See generally Broude, The Consumer and the Parol Evi-
dence Rule: Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1970 DUKE L.J. 881, 891-96 (discuss-
ing Hunt Foods); Wallach, supra note 24, at 669-71 (discussing Hunt Foods).
84. Hunt Foods, 26 A.D.2d at 43, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
85. The broad definition of consistency in Hunt Foods may be justifiable under the parol evi-
dence rule because the purposes of that rule arguably are served so long as the writing has some
binding effect. If parties can rely on a writing to some extent, then their relationship will have an
anchor of certainty, and the writing will be viewed as the primary statement of their agreement.
Notwithstanding this rationale, several recent cases have rejected the Hunt Foods test of consistency
under the parol evidence rule on the ground that the test undermines the rule itself and leads to a
very strained definition of consistency. See, e.g., Luria Bros. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, 600
F.2d 103, 111 (7th Cir. 1979); Alaska N. Dev. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33, 40 (Alaska
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984); Synder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., 38 Md. App, 144,
152, 380 A.2d 618, 623 (1977).
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usage defines a term of an agreement is whether the parties have agreed to
change the normal practice. Therefore, the appropriate question is whether the
express agreement negates the trade usage, not whether the trade usage negates
the express term. Because the parol evidence rule is designed to give priority to
a final written statement, its test for consistency appropriately begins with the
assumption that the written term governs. Section 1-205, in contrast, is based
on the assumption that people expect to follow trade practices. 86 Doctrine de-
veloped under the parol evidence rule, including the Hunt Foods test for consis-
tency, merely confuses, rather than clarifies, the proper function of section 1-
205(4).
The court in Nanakuli Paving relied on official comment 2 to section 2-202
as a second source of the total negation idea:87 "Such writings are to be read on
the assumption that the course of prior dealings between the parties and the
usages of trade were taken for granted when the document was phrased. Unless
carefully negated they have become an element of the meaning of the words
used." 88 The court's reliance on this comment, however, was misplaced; the
comment's discussion of careful negation does not justify a test of total negation.
Comment 2 focuses on the parties' actual expectations and asks whether the
parties intended to negate the trade usage. This approach reaffirms the underly-
ing assumption that people generally expect to follow trade practices and that
their expectations will change only if they actually agree to modify the normal
practice.
89
Thus, comment 2 to section 2-202 indicates that the total negation ap-
proach is misguided. In cases involving conflicts between trade usage and ex-
press terms, comment 2 suggests that the appropriate inquiry is, "Did the parties
agree to negate the trade practice?" By asking this question, courts can both
recognize the significance of trade usage and give effect to the parties' actual
understandings and expectations. Properly interpreted, section 1-205 requires
courts to evaluate the evidence in this way.
2. A Restrictive Definition of Consistency
Although there is a superficial clarity to the total negation test, it often
appears strained and artificial. Because of these defects, several courts have re-
jected the test in favor of a much narrower definition of consistency. Under this
approach, a trade usage is said to be consistent with a written term only if it is in
"reasonable harmony" 90 with the general meaning or "tenor" 9 1 of the term. If
the trade usage and the written term do not have the same general effect, the
courts adopting this narrow view of consistency will find that the written term
86. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
87. Nanakuli Paving, 664 F.2d at 795-96.
88. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 (1978).
89. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text; infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
90. See Synder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., 38 Md. App. 144, 152, 380 A.2d 618, 623
(1977).
91. See Division of Triple T Serv. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 731, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191,
203 (Sup. Ct. 1969), aff'd mem., 34 A.D. 618, 311 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1970).
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controls under section 1-205(4). This approach avoids the artificiality of the
total negation test, but it errs by giving undue weight to written terms.
In General Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. American Air Filter Co.,92 for ex-
ample, the contract included a boilerplate clause stating that the shipper, Ameri-
can Air Filter, did not guarantee shipment on any particular date.93 General
Plumbing argued that the parties actually expected that American Air Filter
would be bound by a trade practice requiring the shipper to deliver all equip-
ment in time for the subcontractor to meet its own deadlines. 94 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of all evidence
relating to the alleged trade usage,95 reasoning that because the trade usage
would impose liability and the written term would prevent liability, the trade
usage and the written term were "contradictory" and the written term must
control.
96
Similarly, in New Mexico ex rel. Conley Lott Nichols Machinery Co. v.
Safeco Insurance Co. 97 the court excluded evidence of a trade usage that did not
totally negate the written term. The equipment lease98 at issue in Nichols speci-
fied a "rental period of 8 months." 99 The lessee returned the equipment early
and refused to pay rent for the remainder of the eight month period. The lessee
argued that, under the prevailing trade practice, it was not liable for the remain-
ing rent. The court upheld the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that the
trade usage changed the "basic meaning" of the written term and therefore was
"inconsistent." 100
In Kologel Co. v. Down in the Village, Inc. 101 Kologel brought suit against
Northwest Airlines, alleging that Northwest had misdelivered a shipment of gar-
ments. The airway bill of lading specified that "delivery will be made to, or in
accordance with the instructions of the consignee." 10 2 The trade practice under
such documents also allowed delivery to the party specified as the "notify
92. 696 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1983).
93. The clause read as follows: "'Any shipping date stated in this quotation or any acknowl-
edgement is [American's] best estimate but [American] makes no guarantee of shipment by any such
date and shall have no liability or other obligation for failure to ship on such date, regardless of
cause, unless expressly stated otherwise herein.'" Id. at 377 n.2. The contract also included a stan-
dard integration clause: "'There shall be no understandings, agreements, or obligations (outside of
this quotation) unless specifically set forth in writing .... " Id.
94. Id. at 377-78. General Plumbing also alleged that the parties had made an oral agreement
conforming to the trade practice. Id.
95. The reported decision cites Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-205 (1981). General Plumbhg, 696
F.2d at 378. This citation is obviously a misprint. The court apparently relied on both §§ 1-205 and
2-202. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-205, 75-2-202 (1981).
96. General Plumbing, 696 F.2d at 378.
97. 100 N.M. 440, 671 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 327, 670 P.2d 581 (1983).
98. The court held that the transaction was covered by Article 2 of the Code because the lease
agreement was accompanied by a "privilege of purchase" contract that incorporated the terms of the
lease. Nichols, 100 N.M. at 444, 671 P.2d at 1155 (adopting the reasoning of Walter Heller & Co. v.
Convalescent Home, 49 II1. App. 3d 213, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (1977)).
99. Nichols, 100 N.M. at 444, 671 P.2d at 1155.
100. Id.
101. 539 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
102. Id. at 728.
[Vol. 64
TRADE USAGE
party."' 10 3 Rejecting Northwest's argument that the trade usage merely quali-
fied the written term, the court held that the trade usage and the written term
were inconsistent and that the written term therefore controlled:
If a trade custom. . . contrary to the plain terms of trade documents,
were given the effect contended for by [the carrier], the ability of such
a distant person to engage in foreign trade. . . would be severely and
unduly handicapped. Allowance of such a practice is certainly de-
structive of the integrity of documents used in international trade.1t 4
The courts have given two justifications for a restrictive definition of the
term "consistency." 10 5 The first justification is mentioned in Kologel: the need
to protect the integrity of documents. 10 6 This rationale proceeds from the as-
sumption that people rely on written documents to define their contractual obli-
gations. Courts adopting this view are reluctant to define contract terms with
reference to trade usage on the ground that it is unjust to allow trade usage to
change the meaning and effect of written terms.
10 7
Although this view appears reasonable, the drafters of section 1-205(4) be-
lieved that the factual presumptions underlying this traditional doctrine were
ii.,ccurate. 108 Based on their own experience and that of many others, 10 9 Karl
103. Kologel was the cosignee, and Down in the Village, Inc. was the notify party. Northwest
delivered the shipment to Down in the Village, which then failed to pay Kologel. Id.
104. Id. at 729 (quoting Koreska v. United Cargo Corp., 23 A.D.2d 37, 42, 258 N.Y.S.2d 432,
437 (1965)).
105. A third reason may be simply that a restrictive definition lends integrity to the "quasi parol
evidence rule," while the "total negation" test blatantly undermines it. Cf. Southern Concrete
Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581, 583-85 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (iberal admis-
sion of trade usage evidence would undermine the law's deference to written agreements), aff'd
mem., 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978).
106. Kologel, 539 F. Supp. at 729; see also Southern Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contrac-
tors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581, 584 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (If trade usage were allowed to alter the meaning
of written terms "then contracts would lose their utility as a means of assigning the risks of the
market."), aff'd mem., 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978).
107. Compare Backus & Harfield, supra note 5, at 601-02 (arguing that it is a violation of free-
dom of contract to allow trade usage to vary written terms of a contract) with Honnold, Letters of
Credit, Custom, Missing Documents and the Dixon Case: A Reply to Backus and Harfield, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 504, 508-09 (1953) (responding that trade usage may accurately reflect the parties'
agreement).
108. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Professor Llewellyn's
views on the relationship between contract law doctrine and practice, see Llewellyn, Our Case-Law
of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J. 779 (1939); Llewellyn, What Price Contract?
An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 712-14 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn, Vhat Price
Contract?].
Information on the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code is available in UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE DRAFTS, supra note 10, in The Karl Llewellyn Papers (unpublished collection avail-
able at the University of Chicago Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn Papers], and in
the records of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See generally R.
ELLINWOOD & NV. TWINING, THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS: A GUIDE TO THE COLLECTION
(1970) (listing the documents included in the Karl Llewellyn Papers). Among the important secon-
dary materials are W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 270-301
(1973) (discussing the genesis of the Code); Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798 (1958) (discussing the changes made by the first states to
adopt the Code).
Some commentators have suggested that the drafting materials should not be used as interpre-
tive guides to the Code, at least not without apology to the legal community. See, e.g., R. SPEIDEL,
R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 41 (3d
ed. 1981). Indeed, at the suggestion of an American Bar Association Committee, one draft of the
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Llewellyn and his colleagues concluded that business people often either ignore
the boilerplate terms of a written document 110 or interpret such terms differently
than lay persons would." Business people use paper to record "dickered
Code included the provision that "[p]rior drafts of text and comments may not be used to ascertain
legislative intent." U.C.C. § 1-102(3)(g) (1953), reprinted in 16 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
DRAFTS, supra note 10, at 44. See Braucher, supra, at 809 (describing reaction against comments as
source of interpretation). Prior drafts of Code provisions and comments, however, are rich sources
of information that should not be overlooked. Of course, any interpretation of the Code must be
warranted by the current version, but consideration of the Code's history can be useful in the task.
109. As Llewellyn noted in a different context, any conclusion about what expectations and
presumptions underlie an agreement is unavoidably colored by the observer's beliefs about "decent"
business ethics and culture. See Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Prob-
lem of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355, 1362 (1940). The rhetoric of legal realism, however,
emphasized the factual basis of experience and judgment, and these clearly were the terms in which
its insights were conceived. See generally W. TWINING, supra note 108 (exploring the ideas and
methods of legal realism); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) (discussing legal realism); cf. Casebeer, supra note 2 (arguing that Llew-
ellyn's work fundamentally rejected a distinction between fact and value).
110. As the drafters observed:
"Written" bargains, in the days when the rules about them crystallized, were bargains
whose detailed terms the two parties had looked over; and the rule was proper, that a
signature meant agreement. When, however, parties bargain today, they think and talk of
such matters as price, credit, date of delivery, description and quantity. These are the
bargained terms. The unmentioned background is assumed without mention to be the fair
and balanced general law and the fair and balanced usage of the particular trade ....
REVISED SALES ACT, SECOND DRAFT, supra note 29, at 332-33 (Comment to § I-C). An introduc-
tory comment to an early draft of the Code reiterated this point:
The business truth is that "explicit" terms are of two strikingly diverse types which are of
strikingly diverse significance. The one type or set of terms is made up of those which are
consciously dickered out by the parties and are commonly represented by their telegrams
or by the typed or handwritten fill-ins on a form. Such terms are indeed always to be read
against the background, but they are also to be always read as being the matters to which
both parties' attention was in fact addressed.
. . . . The familiar rule that "writing controls printing" is again a recognition of the
fact that the parties' minds, in the process of dicker, are directed not to the clauses on a
form but to the terms under actual negotiation. The equally familiar rule calling for "con-
struction most strongly against the party preparing the document" rests upon the same
strong likelihood that the party who merely "adheres" to a standard document has given
its form portions no careful consideration, if any.
Introductory Comment to Parts II and III, Formation and Construction, Llewellyn Papers, supra
note 108, at J.VI.2.h. [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn Papers, Introductory Comment, 1945].
This Introductory Comment was apparently discussed, renamed "General Comment," and ap-
proved by the Joint Advisory Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code in May 1945. See
Meeting of Joint Advisory Committee, May 21 and 22, 1945 (Minutes), Llewellyn Papers, supra
note 108, at J.VII.2.a. The comment was circulated, with minor revisions, as part of the Uniform
Commercial Code Drafts through 1948. See General Comment on Part II, Commercial Law Mater-
ials 13 (Harvard Law School 1948), Llewellyn Papers, supra note 108, at J.X.2.h. [hereinafter cited
as Llewellyn Papers, General Comment, 1948]; General Comment on Parts II and IV, Selected
Comments to Uniform Commercial Code I (Harvard Law School 1947), Llewellyn Papers, supra
note 108, at J.IX.2.a [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn Papers, Selected Comments].
The General Comment was one of many comments omitted from the 1949 version of the Code.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1949), reprinted in 7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS,
supra note 10, at I. There is no reason to think the omission resulted from any change in policy or
interpretation. Prior to 1949, the proposed comments were approximately 1000 pages long; the 1949
abridgment apparently was done to reduce the overall length of the comments. See American Law
Institute, Report of the Director (Nov. 16, 1945), Llewellyn Papers, supra note 108, at J.VII.I.c.
111. The Llewellyn Papers, Introductory Comment, 1945, supra note 110, stated:
First, words are used and are to be read as the words are understood in the trade.
Whatever meaning the words have in the trade is the meaning which, between merchants
or as against a merchant, the agreement incorporates . . . . This does not mean merely
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terms" such as price, quantity, or description, but they expect that other aspects
of the transaction will be governed by normal trade practices. 112 As a result of
this insight, the drafters were reluctant to give much weight to boilerplate terms
that purport to vary a recognized trade practice.
113
The second reason given by some courts to justify a restrictive interpreta-
tion of section 1-205(4) is that evidence of trade usage can be misleading or
difficult to evaluate. 114 To give weight to something so ill-defined, these courts
claim, is to compound the risk of uncertainty and injustice.115 Although this
concern is valid, it is not a good reason to discount well-proved trade usages. It
may be prudent to require clear proof of trade usages,1 16 but once proved, such
usages should be given full weight as evidence of the parties' actual
expectations. 
117
the introduction of usage to resolve an "ambiguity" patent even to an outsider, such as
whether "ton" means 2000 or 2240 pounds. It may mean that a quantity term refers to a
measure which a layman would not see it as even suggesting. . . . It may incorporate a
meaning seemingly contradictory of the language used.
Id. at 4.
112. See authorities cited supra note 110.
113. See infra note 164 and accompanying text; cf. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRA-
DITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362-71 (1960) (discussing the need for a realistic approach to form
contracts).
114. See, eg., Carl Weissman & Sons v. Pepper, 480 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (D. Mont. 1979) (par-
ties would have followed custom in their contract if it was widespread in their trade); Southern
Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581, 584 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (parties
should not be subjected to "an evidentiary free-for-all"), aff'd mer., 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978);
cf. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 113, at 327-32 (discussing the difficulties in proving the existence of a
trade usage).
115. See, eg., Southern Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581,
584 (N.D. Ga. 1975) ("To allow such specific contracts to be challenged by extrinsic evidence might
jeopardize the certainty of the contractual duties which parties have a right to rely on."), aff'd mem.,
569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978).
116. The rule at common law was that trade usage must be "clearly proved." J. LAWSON, THE
LAW OF USAGES AND CUSTOMS § 52, at 97 (1881) (citing Adams v. Pittsburgh Ins. Co., 76 Pa. 411,
414 (1874) ("Doubt must be wholly eliminated from the evidence adduced, or the usage is not well
proved.")). Although there is some indication that this requirement was founded on a mistransla-
tion of the Latin phrase "stricti juris," see C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 132 & n.2 (7th ed.
1964), it still may be a sensible rule. Cf. Gord Indus. Plastics, Inc. v. Aubrey Mfg., Inc., 127 Ill.
App. 3d 589, 591-92, 469 N.E.2d 389, 392 (1984) (dicta that trade usage "must be established by
several witnesses"); Beachcomber Coins, Inc. v. Boskett, 166 N.J. Super. 442, 447, 400 A.2d 78, 80
(App. Div. 1979) (testimony concerning "normal policy" was not sufficient); Mountain Fuel Supply
Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip. Co., 611 P.2d 863, 869 (Wyo. 1980) (the mere testimony of two
witnesses that the usage existed was not sufficient to establish "regularity of observance" under § 1-
205(2)). But cf. Western Indus. Inc. v Newcor Canada, Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984)
(there is no requirement of clear and explicit proof of usage under the Code); Levie, supra note 3
(arguing that there should be no heightened standard for proof of trade usage).
117. Early drafts of the Code included a procedure for empanelling merchant juries to make
recommendations concerning the existence and content of usages and other "merchantile facts,"
following the practice of Lord Mansfield. See REvISED SALES ACT, SECOND DRAFT, supra note 29,
at 531-37 (§§ 59 to 59-D and Comments). These provisions were omitted from the 1944 version of
the Code. The Committee of the Whole had previously questioned the constitutionality and political
acceptability of merchant juries and had discussed numerous practical problems associated with
them. See Minutes of 1942 Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, Committee of the Whole, 126-45; Llewellyn Papers, supra note 108, at J.IV.2.f.
(unpublished minutes also available in the office of the National Conference in Chicago, Illinois).
Although the merchant jury idea is intriguing, there is no reason to think that lay juries cannot
make accurate determinations about trade usage. Evidence of trade usage may consist of expert
opinion, specific instances of the usage, or both. See, eg., Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
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3. A Rule of Construction
Nothing in section 1-205(4) states that evidence may be excluded, and the
best interpretation of section 2-202 allows the admission of trade usage evidence
so long as it is relevant. 118 Consequently, some courts have suggested that rele-
vant trade usage evidence is always admissible'1 9 and that section 1-205(4) is
merely a rule of construction which assigns weight to different kinds of evidence.
Similarly, in Modine Manufacturing Co. v. North East Independent School Dis-
trict,120 the court observed that section 1-205(4) "does not result in the exclusion
of evidence of usage of trade from the agreement, but merely permits inconsis-
tent express terms thereof to control."
121
The rationale for this approach is straightforward: evidence of trade usage
always should be admissible because it is a crucial element of the parties' expec-
tations and therefore of the agreement itself.122 This approach is clearly correct.
Section 1-205(4) is not drafted as a rule of exclusion, and there is no reason to
make it into one.123 If section 1-205(4) is treated as a mere rule of construction,
however, courts must determine when it requires written terms to be given prior-
ity over trade practice. The most pressing questions remain: What is an express
term, and when can it be construed to alter a trade practice? Even those courts
that have refused to exclude trade usage evidence have been misled by the anal-
ogy between section 1-205(4) and the parol evidence rule into giving undue pri-
ority to some written terms and into assuming that written terms can be
understood in isolation.' 24
II. SECTION 1-205(4) RECONSIDERED
The interpretations of section 1-205(4) that are grounded in an analogy to
the parol evidence rule are not entirely satisfactory because all such interpreta-
tions focus on the question of consistency and on a comparison between written
terms and separate trade usages. This approach is problematic because it as-
sumes that written terms have meanings independent of their significance in the
537 F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1976). See generally Levie, supra note 3, at 1102-09 (discussing elements
in the proof of trade usage); Note, supra note 5, at 1206-08 (discussing proof of trade usage). But see
Williams, The Search For Bases of Decision in Commercial Law: Llewellyn Redux (Book Review),
97 HARV. L. REV. 1495, 1506-08 (1984) (arguing that trade usages do not exist).
118. See Kirst, supra note 3, at 816.
119. See, eg., American Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353 N.W.2d 592, 597
(Minn. App. 1984) (trade usage evidence should be admitted if it is relevant); Modine Mfg. Co. v.
North East Indep. School Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 837-41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (trade usage evidence
is admissible to ascertain the intent of the parties) (quoting Dwyer v. City of Brenham, 70 Tex. 30,
32, 7 S.W. 598, 599 (1888). Admissibility of trade usage evidence assumes compliance with other
rules of evidence, of course.
120. 503 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
121. Id. at 840. The court assumed, however, that trade usage evidence could be excluded under
§ 2-202. Modine Mfg., 503 S.W.2d at 838-39; see also Carl Weissman & Sons v. Pepper, 480 F.
Supp. 1364 (D. Mont. 1979) (applying § 1-205 as a rule of construction).
122. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
123. See Kirst, supra note 3, at 832, 835-36.
124. This is not true of the earlier cases discussed supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
One recent case demonstrates a renewed flexibility in evaluating trade usage and express terms. See
Urbana Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Schock, 351 N.W.2d 88 (N.D. 1984).
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trade and that trade practices can be evaluated apart from the contractual con-
text in which they appear. This understanding of business practice is inconsis-
tent with that of the Code.
Moreover, the "total negation" test, used either as a test for admission of
evidence or as a rule of construction, depends on a strained definition of consis-
tency. The test is so broad that it is hard to imagine a situation in which trade
usage could be found to negate a written term totally. 125 One danger of the total
negation approach is that courts rightly will be reluctant to engage in the neces-
sarily strained reading of the statute, even when it would lead to a correct result.
A second, equally serious problem is that the test does not give parties enough
power to agree to change trade usage. By allowing trade usage to govern unless
it totally negates a written term, the total negation doctrine renders an agree-
ment to change a trade usage ineffective unless it is phrased as a total negation of
the usage. This obviously is an inadequate way to resolve conflicts between
trade usage and written terms.
The restrictive approach of General Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. American
Air Filter Co.,12 6 allowing written terms to control over any apparently conflict-
ing trade usage, 127 is equally flawed. In some cases, the parties' actual expecta-
tions are reflected more accurately in the trade usage than in a written term.
The principle of freedom of contract is violated as much by a failure to recognize
the trade usage in such cases as by a refusal to enforce an explicit agreement.
The cases interpreting section 1-205(4) are thus at an impasse: one group of
cases too readily allows trade usage to modify agreed terms, and the other too
easily permits written terms to override recognized trade practices. The un-
resolved conflict between these approaches demonstrates the need to take a fresh
look at the meaning and function of section 1-205(4). A reconsideration of the
key words and concepts used in this provision results in an interpretation that is
independent of the parol evidence rule and harmonious with the Code's orienta-
tion toward commercial practices.
A. The Purpose of Section 1-205(4)
The Code relies heavily on commercial practice to define rights and obliga-
tions within commercial transactions.12 8 This reliance is embodied in the Code
in three ways. First, section 1-103 expressly provides that the law merchant
129
shall supplement provisions of the Code. 130 Second, numerous provisions incor-
porate commercial practice to give content to general standards such as
125. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
126. 696 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1983).
127. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
128. See Danzig, supra note 2, at 629-31; Mooney, supra note 2, at 250-53; Murray, The Realism
of Behaviorism, supra note 2, at 299.
129. For a discussion of the history and current state of the law merchant, see L. TRAKMAN,
THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW (1983).
130. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978); see 1 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-103:7 (3d ed. 1981).
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"merchantability," 13 1 "good faith," 132 "materiality," 133 and the like.134 Last,
section 1-205 provides that trade usage should be considered as the background
of shared expectations that are incorporated into specific agreements. 135
These three aspects of the Code's reliance on commercial practice may be
viewed as a continuum: the law merchant operates as a purely external source
of law, outside the parties' own agreement; commercial meanings of general
standards provide "objective" definitions for obligations that may be created
either by the parties' agreement or by the Code; and, in section 1-205, trade
usage is treated as evidence of the parties' actual expectations, 136 rather than as
an external source of obligation. 137 How section 1-205 works and how trade
usage is thought to reflect the parties' expectations is explained by the official
comment:
This Act rejects both the "lay-dictionary" and the "convey-
ancer's" reading of a commercial agreement. Instead the meaning of
the agreement of the parties is to be determined by the language used
by [the parties] and by their action, read and interpreted in the light of
commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances. The mea-
sure and background for interpretation are set by the commercial con-
text . ... 138
Under section 1-205, then, trade usage is treated as an element of the par-
ties' actual agreement and as part of the parties' voluntarily assumed obliga-
tions. 139 The presumption 4° underlying this section is that parties to a
commercial contract use words as they are defined in the trade and that they
131. U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 2 (1978) ("Goods. . . must be of a quality comparable to that
generally acceptable in that line of trade .... "); see, eg., T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of
Flour, 629 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1980); Wakerman Leather Co. v. Irvin B. Foster Sportswear Co., 34
A.D.2d 594, 308 N.Y.S.2d 103, appeal denied, 26 N.Y.2d 614, 259 N.E.2d 927, 311 N.Y.S.2d 1026
(1970).
132. U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-103(1)(b) (1978) (obligation of good faith in Article 2 includes "obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards"); see also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Union Bank &
Trust, 291 N.W.2d 282, 286 (S.D. 1980) ("reasonable commercial standards" must be determined
according to trade usage).
133. U.C.C. § 2-207 comments 4, 5 (1978) (examples of material variation involve change from
trade usage; examples of no material variation involve conformity with trade usage).
134. See, ag., Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 373
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (trade usage is relevant to whether a breach is "material"); Jamestown Terminal
Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736, 740 (N.D. 1976) (trade usage is relevant to "reasonable
time" for delivery); Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 26, 39-41 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (trade usage is relevant to unconscionability).
135. U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1978).
136. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text. Trade usage is evidence of the parties' expec-
tations even though § 1-205(3) provides that trade usage is binding without proof of a party's actual
knowledge of the practice. See U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1978); authorities cited infra note 145. Con-
tracting parties may expect that trade usages generally will be followed without consciously consid-
ering each specific practice. Cf Murray, Philosophy ofArticle 2, supra note 2, at 4-5 (discussing the
broad concept of "agreement" in the Code).
137. This conception of trade usage does not mean that contractual obligations based on expec-
tations concerning trade usage are purely private. What it does suggest is that the relationship
between "public" and "private" in contract law is more complicated than it might at first appear.
See supra note 13; infra notes 224-41 and accompanying text.
138. U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 1 (1978).
139. Cf. Urbana Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Schock, 351 N.W.2d 88, 92 (N.D. 1984) ("In
cases governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, the courts have regarded the established practices
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intend the consequences of their words and conduct to be those generally under-
stood in the trade. Indeed, this section assumes that in many instances the par-
ties' actual expectations may be based more on trade practices than on the
standard form contracts they sign.'
4 1
The primary purpose of section 1-205 is to give effect to the parties' actual
expectations, regardless of whether those expectations are reflected in writing,
trade usage, or both:
This Act rests on the principle that commercial agreements are to
be given in law the same reasonable and commercial meaning which
they have in the circumstances for commercial men, and that action
under them which is commercially reasonable is to be given recogni-
tion and protection. The elimination of technical traps and of surprise,
and the recognition of such leeways as are in fact commercially reason-
able are taken by the Act to be consistent with clarity of obligation and
with speed and effectiveness of remedy.
I42
and usages within a particular trade or industry as a more reliable indicator of the true intentions of
the parties than the sometimes imperfect and often incomplete language of the written contract.").
140. Important doctrinal consequences flow from the treatment of this presumption as essen-
tially factual because such treatment renders the presumption rebuttable by other evidence of the
parties' understanding. It is a ieparate question whether the presumption itself is based on fact,
policy, or both. Most of the written justifications of § 1-205 focus on the factual basis for the pre-
sumption; they emphasize that parties expect to follow trade usages in most cases. See, eg., U.C.C.
§§ 1-205 comment 4, 2-202 comment 2 (1978); Comment to Section 21, Commercial Law Materials
44-46 (Harvard Law School 1948), Llewellyn Papers, supra note 108, at J.IX.2.a. [hereinafter cited
as Llewellyn Papers, Comment to §21, 1948]. Yet, the drafters argued in addition that trade usages
may represent fair and efficient ways to deal with particular problems. See, e.g., REVISED SALES
ACT, SECOND DRAFT, supra note 29, at 333; K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 113, at 363; cf. Murphy,
supra note 2, at 639 (describing § 1-205 as "a recognition of both the legitimacy and desirability of
adapting commercial law to the needs, desires and practices of the business community").
141. Section 1-205(4) thus has significance to the ongoing search for a theory of standard form
contracts. Cf Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 704 (1939) (reviewing 0. PRAUS-
NITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL
LAw (1937)) (trade practice provides a beginning for the interpretation of standard form contracts)
[hereinafter cited as Llewellyn, Book Review]. Section 1-205(4) provides that when a trade usage
exists, a boilerplate term should not be binding unless there is evidence of actual conscious agree-
ment to the term. See supra text accompanying note 25. Without such actual agreement, it is pre-
sumed that the parties expected to follow the trade usage. Cf. Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys.,
Inc., 355 A.2d 898, 906 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976) (boilerplate term not binding if the parties reached no
actual agreement on the term and did not reasonably expect the term to govern).
The notion that boilerplate terms should not be binding if they do not correspond to the parties'
reasonable expectations is consonant with most theories about standard form contracts. See, ag.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981); Dugal, Standardized Form Contracts-An
Introduction, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1307, 1336 (1978); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 637 (1943); Murray, The Parol
Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1342, 1372-85 (1975); Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1174, 1248-83 (1983); Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation
of Contract Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21 (1984). See generally, K. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 113, at 362-71 (Professor Llewellyn's views on standard form contracts).
142. Llewellyn Papers, Introductory Comment, 1945, supra note 110, at 1. As Professor Llewel-
lyn observed:
[7lo the extent of such divergence between non-legal obligation and the legal obligation
officially recognized on the same facts, the legal obligation ceases to function merely as an
extra insurance that engagements will be performed. That role, in essence, it need not lose.
But it acquires another. It comes to function also as a source of risk. If the other party
appeals to law, then to the extent that the obligation is viewed by laymen and by law-men
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Full effect should be given to trade usage because in the business world, people
expect to comply with normal practices. Moreover, trade practices, if fair and
reasonable, frequently represent efficient ways to handle specific or local
problems, 143 and they often accurately reflect the shared values of a commu-
nity.144 For these reasons, the Code consistently provides that trade practices
are binding on members of the trade 145 who do not actually agree to vary their
normal obligations.
The principle of freedom of contract, however, requires that if the parties
agree to change trade usage, the agreement must be given legal effect'so long as
there is no external reason to override the agreement. If parties agree to vary
normal trade usage, then section 1-205(4) provides that their explicit agreement
controls; otherwise, trade usage controls. The purpose of section 1-205(4) is to
allow parties to alter trade usage voluntarily, while maintaining the presumption
that parties normally will not choose to do so.
Accordingly, when a written term appears to conflict with a trade practice,
two questions must be asked: (1) Did the parties agree to the written term? (Is
it an "express term of [their] agreement"? 146) and (2) What does the written
term mean in its commercial context? In particular, does the written term mean
that trade practice will not be followed? If these questions are answered affirma-
tively, then trade usage is not binding. Otherwise, it is.
This understanding of the relationship between trade usage and express lan-
guage involves a subtle, yet significant, shift in emphasis from doctrine devel-
oped under the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule gives prominence to
written terms and focuses on whether extrinsic evidence is inconsistent with the
writing. In contrast, section 1-205(4) gives prominence to trade usage and asks
differently, I shall either get less, or be held to more, than the customary understanding
calls for.
Llewellyn, What Price Contract?, supra note 108, at 713 (emphasis added).
143. Cf REVISED SALES ACT, SECOND DRAFT, supra note 29, at 333 (comment to § 1-C) ("ex-
pression of a body of fair and balanced usage is a great convenience, a gain in clarity and certainty,
an overcoming of the difficulty faced by the law in regulating the multitude of different trades").
144. Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 113, at 330 (arguing that the failure to recognize the trade
usage in Dixon, Irmaos & CIA v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 850 (1945), "would have amounted to the court's sanctioning of irresponsible banking").
145. See U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1978). This section makes trade usage binding on members of the
trade, regardless of their actual knowledge of the usage. See, eg., Foxco Indus., Ltd. v. Fabric
World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 985 (5th Cir. 1979); Marion Coal Co. v. Marc Rich & Co. Int'l, 539 F.
Supp. 903, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 59
Cal. App. 3d 948, 956-57, 131 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188 (1976); Gord Indus. Plastics, Inc. v. Aubrey Mfg.
Inc., 127 Ill. App. 3d 589, 592, 469 N.E.2d 389, 392 (1984). The rule of § 1-205(3) may be justified
on several grounds: (1) it is very unlikely that a trade's members are ignorant of its usages; (2) one
can expect to follow all accepted practices without knowing the content of each one; and (3) the law
should encourage business people to learn the usages of their trade. See Warren, Trade Usage and
Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible Rule, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 515 (1981).
One difficulty in applying § 1-205(3) lies in determining who is a member of the trade. Making
such a determination may require a court to consider whether a party has actually had an opportu-
nity to learn the trade practices. At least one court has held that newcomers to a trade should not be
bound by its usages. See Union Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Haas & Haynie Corp., 577 F.2d 568 (9th
Cir. 1978) (newcomer to the trade was not bound by usages of which it was unaware); cf. Flower
City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr., 591 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1979) (newly formed,
minority-owned business was not bound by trade usages).
146. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1978).
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whether the parties agreed to change it. The purpose of section 1-205(4) is quite
different from that of the parol evidence rule. Recognition of this difference
requires a significant change in the way section 1-205(4) is interpreted.
B. "Express Terms"
The parol evidence rule is concerned with written contract terms. 147 Under
its influence, courts have assumed that the phrase "express terms of the agree-
ment" in section 1-205(4) means the same thing as "final written terms" under
section 2-202. The problem with this view is that a written term can be "final"
under the parol evidence rule and related doctrines 148 if it appears in a signed or
otherwise formalized document regardless of whether both parties actually con-
sidered and agreed to the term.149 Although this approach may be useful in
other contexts,150 it is not appropriate under section 1-205(4).
When there is a trade usage covering a particular matter, members of the
trade expect it to be followed, unless they have actually agreed to change it.
151
It makes no sense to say there can be a blanket assent to negate trade prac-
tices. 152 Under section 1-205(4), therefore, it is crucial to determine whether the
147. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 7.2, at 447-51 (discussing the parol evi-
dence rule); Wallach, supra note 24 (discussing § 2-202).
148. Two additional doctrines lead courts to find written terms to be final: the "duty to read
rule," see J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-42, at 328-29 (1977), and the
closely related notion that the signing of a document necessarily constitutes a "manifestation of
assent" to the terms contained therein, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(1)
(1981). Both doctrines are closely tied to the parol evidence rule, inasmuch as they justify the con-
clusion that written terms are final despite a lack of actual agreement. These doctrines are not
logically necessary under the parol evidence rule, but they flow concurrently from its premises.
149. Although the parol evidence rule requires an intention that the writing be the final state-
ment of the agreement, this intention is often presumed from the formal writing itself. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(3) (1981) ("Where the parties reduce an agreement to
a writing which in view of its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete
agreement, it is taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is established by other evidence that the
writing did not constitute a final expression."). Section 2-202 requires a specific determination by
the court before a writing is treated as "complete," but such a determination is not required for a
finding of finality. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978); Wallach, supra note 24, at 665-68.
150. The duty to read rule and the presumption of assent to a signed writing have been seriously
questioned, and several exceptions or qualifications have been found by courts and commentators,
especially in connection with adhesion contracts. See, eg., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 4.26,
at 293-302; Rakoff, supra note 141, at 1183-97; Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529, 539-45 (1971). The duty to read rule and the
presumption of assent may be justified, however, when there is no trade usage, course of dealing, or
other actual agreement. In such cases, it may be appropriate to use written terms on which there
was no actual agreement as gap-fillers, so long as the terms are not unduly burdensome. Professor
Llewellyn would argue that parties do expect to be bound by such terms because, by signing an
agreement, they give a "blanket assent" to all reasonable terms contained in it. See K. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 113, at 370; see also infra note 152 (discussing Professor Llewellyn's notion of blanket
assent).
151. See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
152. Professor Llewellyn's notion of blanket assent provides a persuasive argument in favor of
enforcing most boilerplate terms:
The answer, I suggest, is this: Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate
clauses, we can recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What
has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of
the transaction, and but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a
specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form,
which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. The fine
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parties actually agreed to change the trade usage.1 53 If they did not, the trade
usage should be followed.
In accordance with this view, the court in Gindy Manufacturing Corp. v.
Cardinale Trucking154 was willing to enforce a trade practice imposing liability
for defects on the seller, even though the written agreement included a clause
stating that the vehicle was sold "as is," without warranties. Under section 1-
205(4), the appropriate question was whether the parties had agreed to change
the normal practice. The court concluded that the "as is" clause did not consti-
tute such an agreement. 155 In the court's view, the "as is" clause was not a part
of the parties' actual understanding. It was not a "term of [their] agreement"' 156
and therefore did not control the contrary usage of trade.15 7
As the Gindy case suggests, to be an "express term" under section 1-205(4),
a written term must have been considered and agreed to by both parties.
Although the Code does not define the phrase "express terms," the modifying
word "express" suggests a requirement of conscious communication beyond that
included in the Code's definition of "term." 158 Moreover, earlier drafts of the
Code and comments clearly indicate that the phrase "express terms" was meant
print which has not been read has no business to cut under the reasonable meaning of those
dickered terms which constitute the dominant and only real expression of agreement, but
much of it commonly belongs in.
K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 113, at 370.
This analysis does not suggest, however, that there can be a blanket assent to written terms that
purport to change trade usage. In the same comment that discusses the idea of blanket assent to fair
and reasonable terms, Professor Llewellyn and his colleagues wrote that "attention must be called to
a desire to contract in material variance from the accepted commercial pattern." Llewellyn Papers,
Introductory Comment, 1945, supra note 110, at 11, 14. For criticism of the blanket assent argu-
ment, see Rakoff, supra note 141, at 1198-1205; Slawson, supra note 141, at 32-37.
153. A standard merger clause should not be treated as evidence of such an agreement. See, e.g.,
Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 782 n.14 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. Kirst,
supra note 3, at 863-69 (arguing that a standard merger clause should not be sufficient to warrant the
exclusion of trade usage evidence). But see General Plumbing, 696 F.2d at 378 (merger clause pre-
cludes trade usage evidence that contradicts the writing); Duesenberg, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and
Documents of Title, 38 Bus. LAW. 1109, 1114 (1983) (merger clause should exclude trade usage
evidence).
154. 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (Law Div. 1970); see supra notes 40-45 and accompany-
ing text.
155. 111 N.J. Super. at 398, 268 A.2d at 353.
156. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1978).
157. This result is correct even though the term might qualify as "final" under the parol evi-
dence rule and might, in the absence of a trade usage or course of dealing, be binding on the parties.
The approach followed in Gindy is consistent with U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1978). Under that provi-
sion, an additional term in an acceptance that does not "materially alter" the contract may become
part of an agreement between merchants, even if it is not actually agreed to by the offeror. The
comments to this section make it clear that a term purporting to vary a trade usage would materially
alter the contract and thus would not become binding without actual assent. Id. § 2-207 comments
4, 5; see, eg., Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 592 F. Supp. 75, 81 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (An
additional term in the acceptance materially altered the contract because it conflicted with the trade
practice. The court emphasized that the written term was not actually agreed to by both parties and
for that reason alone should not be permitted to alter the normal and expected practice.), affd, 740
F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984); cf Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1580 (10th Cir. 1984)
(trade usage may be used to fill a gap left when written terms are "knocked out" under U.C.C. § 2-
207(3) (1978)).
158. "Term" is defined merely as "that portion of an agreement which relates to a particular
matter." U.C.C. § 1-201(42) (1978).
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to refer only to terms on which the parties actually agreed. One of the earliest
drafts of section 1-205(4) read as follows: "The terms of the agreement and any
.. .usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with
each other; but when such construction is unreasonable specific terms shall con-
trol. . . usage of trade." 159 The concept of "specific terms" came from earlier
draft provisions in which the phrases "express words" 160 or "special bargain"
161
were used to signify terms that were actually contemplated and agreed to by the
parties.
162
The phrase "express terms" was first used in the Third Draft of the Revised
Uniform Sales Act. 163 There is nothing to indicate that the change in terminol-
ogy from "specific terms" to "express terms" represented any change in concep-
tion. Indeed, the original comment to section 1-205, which was written after the
phrase "express terms" was inserted, reiterated that trade usage could be over-
come only by an actual, conscious agreement:
[A]ttention must be called to a desire to contract at material variance
from the accepted commercial pattern of contract ...
Where . . .the background of trade or circumstances does not
make it entirely clear to both parties that performance above and be-
yond the usual commercial pattern will be necessary, attention must be
called to this fact.164
159. American Law Institute, Code of Commercial Law-Sales Act, Preliminary Draft No. 8,
First Installment, Section 18 (May, 1943), Llewellyn Papers, supra note 108, at J.V.2.a. (markings
omitted, emphasis added).
160. See REVISED SALES ACT, SECOND DRAFr, supra note 29, at 334-35 ("Eixpress words are
to be construed, where that is reasonable, as consistent with, rather than as a displacement of, such
usage .... ).
161. The term "special bargain" was defined as follows:
Special bargain means a term or provision of such character that both parties must be
taken to have actually and consciously had its concrete content in mind when bargaining
and concluding their agreement. Factors of weight in establishing a term or provision as
being a special bargain are:
(a) that it is a term or provision which is commonly the subject-matter of conscious atten-
tion, such as price, quantity, description, time of delivery, and the like;
(b) that it is a term or provision particularly written into the documents, as contrasted
with a printed form provision;
(c) that it is so conspicuous as to force attention to (the detail of its) content and effect.
Section 1-CC Special Bargain Displacing Provisions on Usage (handwritten draft in Karl Llewel-
lyn's personal copy of the Revised Uniform Sales Act, Second Draft (1941)). Llewellyn Papers,
supra note 108, at J.III.2.b. [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn Papers, Draft Section 1-CC].
162. See also National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Report on a Re-
vised Uniform Sales Act, § l-C(l)(b) (1941), Llewellyn Papers, supra note 108, at J.IV.2.b (dealing
with the displacement of provisions of the Act).
When both of the parties have so directed their attention to a particular point that the
coverage of that point ... may fairly be regarded as the deliberate desire of both, and as
reflecting a considered bargain on that particular point, the provision of the contract on
that point is called in this Act a "particularized term" of the bargain.
Id.
163. Uniform Commercial Code, Revised Uniform Sales Act, Third Draft, § 22(4)(b) (1943),
Llewellyn Papers, supra note 108, at J.V.2.b. ("The express terms of the agreement and any ...
usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such
construction is unreasonable express terms shall control ... usage of trade.") (emphasis added).
164. Llewellyn Papers, Selected Comments, supra note 110, at 9, 13.
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"Express terms," then, are those terms that are actually contemplated and
agreed to by both parties. Not all written terms are "express terms," 1 65 and the
mere inclusion of a term purporting to vary normal practice in a printed form is
not enough to prove that both parties agreed to it. 166 Something more is neces-
sary to show that the parties actually expected that trade usage would not be
followed in a particular transaction.
Inquiry into whether there was actual agreement to a particular term does
not, however, require courts to delve into subjective intent and other such quag-
mires. 167 The question is what the parties' probable intention was. 168 The rele-
vant inquiry is whether both parties had actual knowledge of the term and
manifested assent to it.' 69 Because the Code assumes that parties normally ex-
pect to follow trade practices, it is appropriate to put the burden of showing
probable agreement on the party seeking to change a trade practice.' 7 0 Simi-
larly, there should be a presumption against probable agreement when, for ex-
ample, a disputed term is inconspicuous or unclear. 171 Such rules would further
165. Thus, although a written term may be binding under the duty to read rule, it will not
control over a contrary trade usage. Similarly, a written term may be "final" for purposes of the
parol evidence rule but not an "express term" under § 1-205(4). See supra notes 156-57 and accom-
panying text. This result accords with the presumption that parties normally expect a formal writing
to be the "last word" on their negotiations, but do not expect to negate trade usages. See supra note
65. This distinction is reflected in the willingness of some courts to give less weight to written terms
when contrary trade usages are presented than when inconsistent prior agreements are alleged. See,
eg., Action Time Carpets, Inc. v. Midwest Carpet Brokers, Inc., 271 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 1978)
(evidence of oral agreements should be excluded, but evidence of trade usage could be admitted).
166. See supra note 152.
167. Certainly, the objective theory of contract interpretation does not now mean that actual
understandings are irrelevant, if it ever did. Compare Judge Hand's famous dicta in Hotchkiss v.
National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to
do with the personal, or individual intent of the parties."), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231
U.S. 50 (1913) with Judge Frank's dissenting view in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 757,
764 (2d Cir. 1946) ("Fortunately, most judges are too common-sensible to allow, for long, a passion
for aesthetic elegance, or for the appearance of an abstract consistency, to bring about obviously
unjust results."). See generally Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939,
942-52 (1967) (observing that actual understandings are relevant to contract interpretation); Sharp,
Mr. Justice Holmes: Some Modern Views: Contracts, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 268 (1964) (arguing that
Holmes' defense of the objective theory was inconsistent with his belief in freedom of contract).
168. I am indebted to Professor John Honnold for the term "probable" as used in the text. This
term acknowledges that purely subjective intention is unascertainable while maintaining the Code's
focus on the parties' actual expectations. See also Levie, supra note 3, at 1106-07 ("The Code views
trade usage as a way of determining the parties probable intent."). Professor Honnold also raised the
question whether the issue of probable intention should be decided by the judge or the jury. This is a
difficult and important question that should be the subject of another article. My preliminary view is
that the existence of agreement on a particular term is ultimately a factual question, but perhaps it is
one that should be decided by the court because of the complexity of the issue and in order to
promote consistent and articulate decisions. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 7.14,
at 515-17 (discussing the role of court and jury in the interpretation of contracts); C. WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92, at 614-16 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing the possibility of a complexity
exception to the constitutional right to jury trial).
169. See the factors mentioned in Llewellyn Papers, Draft Section 1-CC, supra note 161.
170. This allocation of the evidentiary burden would be consistent with the presumption that
tradespeople normally expect trade practices to be followed. See supra notes 140-45 and accompa-
nying text.
171. Cf Kenneth Reed Constr. Corp. v. United States, 475 F.2d 583, 588 (Ct. Cl. 1973) ("If it
was the intention of defendant to alter existing trade practices. . . it had the obligation to so state in
clear and unambiguous language."); Tufano Contracting Corp. v. United States, 356 F.2d 535, 539
(Ct. Cl. 1966) ("Because use of such blocking was not customary in the trade, it was incumbent upon
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the guiding principle of section 1-205(4) that unless a term is specifically agreed
upon, it does not change the normal expectation that trade practices will be
followed.
C. The Meaning of Express Terms
Once the court has determined that the parties agreed to a term that pur-
ports to vary trade usage, the next step must be to determine the meaning of that
term. The analogy between section 1-205(4) and the parol evidence rule is par-
ticularly harmful here. Under the parol evidence rule and the related plain
meaning rule, 172 many courts treat written terms as if they had a meaning apart
from their commercial context.173 This approach is a consequence of the parol
evidence rule's focus on consistency. Because it appears circular to say that
parol evidence can be considered to determine whether a writing is consistent
with the parol evidence, courts tend to define the meaning of a writing without
reference to extrinsic evidence. Although some courts do not follow this
path, 174 the tendency to disregard commercial context is strong whenever the
inquiry centers on a question of consistency, as it does under the "quasi parol
evidence rule" interpretation of section 1-205(4).
17 5
If, however, one focuses on the commercial meaning of express terms rather
than on the question of consistency, analysis is directed in a more productive
way. Instead of comparing "extrinsic" evidence of a trade usage on the one side
with the "plain meaning" of an express term on the other, one may look to
commercial practice to see what the express term means. In particular, one may
ask whether the express term is understood to modify or negate the trade prac-
the architect to state the requirement with clarity."); Celebrity, Inc. v. Kemper, 96 N.M. 508, 509,
632 P.2d 743, 744 (1981) (written terms can change a course of dealing only if specific attention is
called to them).
172. Although the plain meaning rule is not a necessary corollary to the parol evidence rule, the
two doctrines are closely linked, in that the parol evidence rule's focus on consistency encourages a
plain meaning view of the written terms, as discussed in the text.
The official comment to § 2-202 states: "This section definitely rejects. . . [t]he premise that
the language used has the meaning attributed to such language by rules of construction existing in
the law rather than the meaning which arises out of the commercial context in which it was used
. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment l(b) (1978).
173. See, ag,, Southern Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581
(N.D. Ga. 1975) (trade usage allowing flexibility in quantity could not alter the plain meaning of
written terms), aff'd mem., 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978); Doppelt v. Wander & Co., 19 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 503, 505 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1976) (trade usage cannot be used to contradict
"plain and unambiguous terms" of agreement); Stan D. Bowles Distrib. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
69 N.C. App. 341, 349, 317 S.E.2d 684, 689 (1984) (trade usage granting exclusivity to beer distribu-
tors was overridden by the plain meaning of a written term); Swiden Appliance & Furniture, Inc. v.
National Bank, 357 N.W.2d 271, 275 (S.D. 1984) (plain meaning of written terms controlled a con-
trary practice among bankers); cf. Loeb & Co. v. Martin, 349 So. 2d 11, 12-13 (Ala. 1977) (jury
instruction that trade usage need not be considered if written document clearly showed parties'
intent not reversible error).
174. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Swiss Credit Bank, 597 F.2d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1979); Dreyfus
Co. v. Royster Co., 501 F. Supp. 1169, 1172-73 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Urbana Farmers Union Elevator
Co. v. Shock, 351 N.W.2d 88, 91-92 (N.D. 1984); Morgan v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 34 Wash.
App. 801, 808-09, 663 P.2d 1384, 1388-90 (1983).
175. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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tice. This is the crucial question under section 1-205(4).176
Two recent cases demonstrate contrasting analytic approaches to determin-
ing the meaning of express terms under section 1-205(4). The dispute in Ad-
vance Process Supply Co. v. Litton Industries Credit Corp. 177 arose because
Litton, the assignee, with recourse, of a sales contract under which money was
owed to Advance Process, failed to file financing statements necessary to perfect
a security interest. Under normal trade usage, Advance Process would not have
been liable for losses resulting from Litton's failure to perfect the security
interest. 178
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
trade practice did not apply because, under an express term 179 of the contract,
Advance Process warranted that all required statements "have been correctly
filed."' 80 The court held that the plain meaning of this term was inconsistent
with the trade usage; therefore, the express term controlled, and Litton was not
liable for the improper filing.
181
Although the lay meaning of the disputed term may have appeared "plain
on its face,"' 182 it is not clear that the meaning assigned by the court was the
meaning actually understood by the parties. Advance Process argued that the
term under which it warranted the proper filing of financing statements did not
change the normal expectation that Litton would be liable for its own mistakes.
Indeed, it is possible that the commercial meaning of the term was that Advance
Process warranted all filings for which it was responsible but not those for which
Litton was responsible.183 The Advance Process decision demonstrates that even
when parties have actually agreed to a term that appears inconsistent with a
trade practice, a court must determine the commercial meaning of the term
before it can resolve the question of consistency under section 1-205(4).
The decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas in Dreyfus Co. v. Royster Co. 184 contrasts sharply with the Seventh
176. Indeed, this is the question raised in the official comment: Does the writing "carefully
negate" the trade usage? See U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 (1978); supra text accompanying notes 88-
89.
177. 745 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir. 1984).
178. Id. at 1079.
179. The court made no finding as to whether there had been actual agreement on the written
term. If there were no actual agreement, the term would not have been an "express term," and the
trade usage should have governed. See supra notes 147-71 and accompanying text. For the purposes
of this discussion, it is assumed that there was actual agreement on the term at issue.
180. Advance Process, 745 F.2d at 1079 & n.4.
181. Id. at 1080. For other cases using a plain meaning approach, see Kreis v. Venture Out in
America, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); C & A Constr. Co. v. Benning Constr. Co., 256
Ark. 621, 509 S.W.2d 302 (1974); Fort Wayne Bank Bldg., Inc. v. Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp., 160
Ind. App. 26, 309 N.E.2d 464 (1974).
182. Advance Process, 745 F.2d at 1079.
183. Indeed, Litton originally purchased the secured debt without recourse to Advance. The
written term in which Advance guaranteed all proper filings was adopted in connection with that
transaction; at that time, there was no reason to include a clause making Litton responsible for its
own filings. The parties later agreed that the sale would be with recourse to Advance, but no change
was made in this written term. Id. at 1077-78.
184. 501 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Ark. 1980). For other cases rejecting the plain meaning approach,
see cases cited supra note 174.
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Circuit's analysis in Advance Process. The dispute in Dreyfus involved the sale of
soybean seeds. The buyer claimed that the seller had failed to notify him that
the soybeans were available for delivery. The seller responded that the normal
trade practice in such transactions gave the buyer the right to pick up the goods
at his convenience and did not require the seller to give notice of availability.
185
The buyer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the trade usage was over-
come by an express term of the contract calling for a "March delivery."
186
Although the express term 8 7 appeared to require the seller to make the
soybeans available at a certain time, the court acknowledged the potential signif-
icance of trade usage and held that there was a genuine issue of fact concerning
the parties' actual intent to change the normal practice. The court ruled that the
trier of fact must evaluate the commercial meaning of "March delivery" and
decide whether that term required the seller to give notice of availability or de-
lay.188 Although the delivery term had a clear meaning on its face, the court
recognized that it could have a totally different significance to those in the
trade. 
89
The recognition that members of a commercial community may use com-
mon words in special ways or that they may assign added significance to com-
mon forms of communication is fundamental to applying section 1-205. Because
contractual obligations are based primarily on individual volition, the law must
interpret contractual relationships as they are understood by the parties to the
contract. If the parties -are members of a trade community, their understanding
will be formed by their experience in the community. In recognition of this
commercial reality, section 1-205 compels courts to interpret contracts accord-
ing to their commercial meanings.
D. "Consistency"
When the phrase "express terms" in section 1-205(4) is correctly found to
include only those terms actually agreed to by the parties, interpreted as those in
the trade would understand them, the notion of consistency acquires a signifi-
cance different from its import under the parol evidence rule. Neither the ex-
pansive total negation test nor a restrictive test of consistency provides a proper
focus. The crucial goal under section 1-205(4) should be to determine what ef-
fect the express term has on the trade practice. Did the parties expect that the
normal trade practice would be followed despite the clause, or did they believe
that the clause required a different procedure? The best way to answer this ques-
185. The contract included a clause providing for a storage fee for seed unclaimed after March
31. Plaintiff's witness explained that this clause triggered the trade practice described in the text.
Dreyfus, 501 F. Supp. at 1172.
186. Id.
187. This characterization of the delivery clause assumes that the parties actually agreed to the
term.
188. See Id. at 1172-73.
189. Cf. Ebasco Serv., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 460 F. Supp. 163, 184 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (finding that parties used apparently ambiguous language in their written contract because it
had a widely accepted meaning in the trade).
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tion is to determine whether, in the trade, the presence of similar express terms
causes parties to vary the normal practice. If it does, the express term is incon-
sistent with the trade practice; if it does not, the express term is consistent.
In Dreyfus, for example, the court correctly recognized the need to deter-
mine the effect of the "March delivery" term on the trade practice permitting
buyers to choose when to pick up their goods. As the court noted, the crucial
question was "whether or not the usage of trade. . . recognize[d] the existence
of the 'March delivery' term." 190 If the trade usage was observed in transactions
involving similar delivery terms, then the "March delivery" term should impose
no additional obligation on the seller. If the trade usage was not followed in
transactions involving similar terms, however, then the express term and the
trade usage would be inconsistent, and the express term should control.
Under this approach, the issue of consistency turns primarily on a determi-
nation of the commercial meaning of the express term. As the original comment
to section 1-205(4) explained:
When the express language used in the agreement seems to con-
flict with the applicable usage of trade. . . a vital question is raised by
[section 1-205(4)]. . . . The question becomes . .. in the first in-
stance: What does the explicit language, read commercially, mean?
... The question is, second, how far does the language, read com-
mercially, even purport to negate or modify an otherwise clear...
usage of trade?
For inconsistency of language and background exists merely be-
cause the words used mean something different to an outsider than they
do to the merchants who used that language in the light of the commer-
cial background against which they contracted. 191
If merchants actually agree to a term but continue to follow a related trade
practice, then they probably do not believe that the term is inconsistent with the
usage, regardless of the lay meaning of their words. Inconsistency occurs only
when the trade usage and the express term do not coexist in practice. If, after
agreeing to a term, merchants do not continue to follow a related trade practice,
then the term and the trade practice are inconsistent.
The drafters' views on the question of consistency are reflected in their ap-
proval of Dixon, Irmaos & CIA v. Chase National Bank, 192 which was decided
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1944 when the
initial drafts of the Uniform Commercial Code were being written. 193 The dis-
190. Dreyfus, 501 F. Supp. at 1172-73; see supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
191. Llewellyn Papers, General Comment, 1948, supra note 110, at 21 (emphasis added). For a
discussion of the background of this General Comment, see supra note 110.
192. 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945).
193. The Introductory Comment was presented and approved by the Joint Advisory Committee
in 1945. Llewellyn Papers, Introductory Comment, 1945, supra note 110. Dixon, Irmaos became
the focus of disagreement between Backus & Harfield, supra note 5, and Honnold, supra note 107.
For other discussions of Dixon, Irmaos, see H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 5, at 437-48; Honnold, A
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pute involved an apparent conflict between the written terms of a letter of credit
and a trade practice in the New York banking industry.
Dixon, Irmaos, an exporter of cotton, sought payment under two letters of
credit issued by Chase National Bank. The bank refused payment 194 on the
ground that Dixon, Irmaos had failed to submit a "full set" of the bills of lading,
as required by one clause of the letters. 195 The trial court found that under a
well-recognized trade practice, New York banks routinely accepted partial sets
of bills of lading if the documents were accompanied by indemnity agreements
or guarantees against loss resulting from the absent documents. 196 The court
specifically found that this practice was followed even when a letter of credit
called for a "full set of bills of lading."'
1 97
As the trial court in Dixon, Irmaos concluded, among New York bankers,
the express term requiring a full set of bills of lading did not mean that a full set
had to be tendered, but only that a partial set had to be accompanied by a relia-
ble indemnity, as the trade practice required. The written term, therefore, was
consistent with the trade usage. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit agreed with this conclusion, holding that Dixon, Irmaos had
complied with the letters of credit by tendering a partial set of bills and a guar-
antee against any resulting loss. 19 8 The court observed: "In our opinion, the
custom under consideration explains the meaning of the technical phrase 'full set
of bills of lading' and is incorporated by implication into the terms of the defend-
ant's letters of credit."
199
The drafters of the Code cited Dixon, Irmaos to demonstrate that a usage
Footnote to the Controversy Over the Dixon Case, Custom and Letters of Credit: The Position of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (1953); Kirst, supra note 3, at 828-32.
194. The apparent reason for Chase Bank's refusal was that its client was a Belgian bank, and
the German invasion of Belgium made payment unlikely. As the court of appeals observed: "It is
clear that the Chase Bank would in this very case have honored the drafts, had they been presented
before the German invasion of Belgium." Dixon, Irmaos, 144 F.2d at 762.
195. Id. at 760 n.1. The full set included two bills of lading; the normal practice was to send one
by air and one by water, to insure against the loss of either. See id. at 762; Honnold, supra note 107,
at 506.
196. Dixon, Irmaos, 144 F.2d at 761. The trial court also found that this practice was within the
discretion of each bank. The court of appeals disregarded this finding of discretion as inconsistent
with the conclusion that the usage existed and with the evidentiary record, which disclosed no in-
stance in which a bank had refused to follow the practice. Id. at 761-62.
The original comment on §21, the predecessor to § 1-205, endorsed the appellate court's view.
The bank in Dixon, Irmaos had argued that a mere series of favors should not be construed as
creating an obligation for the bank to accept partial sets of bills of lading. The comment responded
to this argument by observing, in essence, that when a trade usage is established, the practice is
"beyond doubt" obligatory and is not merely a multitude of coincidental favors. Llewellyn Papers,
Comment to § 21, 1948, supra note 140, at 46. But cf. Cornswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigerator, Inc.,
594 F.2d 129, 136 (5th Cir.) ("We can find no justification, except in cases of conduct of the sort
giving rise to promissory estoppel, for holding that a contractually reserved power, however distaste-
ful, may be lost through nonuse." This case involved the practices of only one company, however,
which presumably did not constitute a trade usage.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979); AMF Head
Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222 (D. Ariz. 1978)
(recognizing a written trade code granting banks discretion to refuse to amend delivery address in
letters of credit).
197. Dixon, Irmaos, 144 F.2d at 761.
198. Dixon, Irmaos tendered one of the two bills of lading and an indemnity agreement. Id.
199. Id. at 762.
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"may incorporate a meaning seemingly contradictory of the language used. '"2°°
Although a usage may contradict the language used, it is not inconsistent with
an express term unless the commercial meaning negates the practice so that the
express term and the trade practice do not coexist in fact.20 1
This notion of consistency focuses attention on the meaning and signifi-
cance given to express terms by members of the trade and on the contractual
context of a trade usage. The question is simple: Does the term coexist with the
trade practice in the real world? If so, there is no inconsistency, regardless of
the "plain meaning" of the express term. Once freed of the influence of the parol
evidence rule, section 1-205(4) directs courts to resolve issues of consistency ac-
cording to the shared expectations and understanding of the commercial com-
munities to which parties belong. Section 1-205(3) provides that trade usages
should be incorporated into contracts between members of the trade or others
who are aware of the trade's practices, and section 1-205(4) effectively requires
that trade usage and written terms be integrated in accordance with their com-
mercial meanings. This approach gives priority to the parties' actual under-
standing; any more formal system of integration would risk imposing
unexpected and unwarranted obligations on the parties.
E. Section 1-205(4) Applied
Section 1-205(4) embodies the insights that trade usage is often more relia-
ble evidence of the parties' actual expectations than are the terms of a printed
document and that the trade meaning of written words may be totally different
from their significance to a lay person. This provision gives full recognition to
trade usage in defining both the content and consequences of an agreement.
The first step for a court 202 in analyzing an apparent conflict between a
written term and a trade usage under section 1-205(4) is to determine whether a
200. Llewellyn Papers, Introductory Comment, 1945, supra note 110, at 4. An early draft of the
official comment to § 1-205, which was very similar to the current comment, included a cross-refer-
ence to this part of the Introductory or General Comment. See Llewellyn Papers, Comment to
Section 21, 1948, supra note 140, at 49 ("The problem of Subsection (4)(b) on the reading together of
express terms and usage is fully developed in the General Comment to Part II, paragraphs 6 to 9.").
201. Professor Llewellyn offered a slightly different explanation of Dixon, Irmaos in THE COM-
MON LAW TRADITION. He noted that the requirement of a full set of bills of lading was originally
used in letters of credit contemplating export shipments. This requirement was necessary because
overseas shippers issue two original bills. The requirement presents no significant obstacle to Ameri-
can-based seller-beneficiaries who simply receive the bills and tender them to New York banks.
Import shipments are treated differently because overseas shippers often send their bills of lading to
agents in New York for collection. To assure prompt payment, the set of bills is separated and sent
by different modes of transportation. In such cases the seller's representative will have a good
chance of receiving at least one of the bills of lading in time to tender it for payment. The problem in
Dixon, Irmaos, Professor Llewellyn argued, was that "the protective condition calling for a 'full set
of bills of lading' was carried over from the export letters of credit, where the clause makes sense,
into the import letters, where in its literal form it makes no sense at all." K. LLEWELLYN, supra
note 113, at 328-29. This explanation may be consistent with the court of appeals' conclusion in
Dixon, Irmaos that the clause requiring a full set of bills of lading was understood to allow for
substitute documentation. Alternatively, it may suggest that the clause was mistakenly inserted
without any actual agreement and, therefore, was not an express term under § 1-205(4). See supra
notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
202. This approach may also be followed by a jury if these are deemed to be jury questions. For
further discussion of this issue, see supra note 168 and the authorities cited therein.
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trade practice relevant to the dispute exists.20 3 Next, the court must determine
whether the written term qualifies as an express term. 20 4 Finally, the commer-
cial meaning of the express term must be established; in particular, the court
must decide whether the express term requires that the normal trade practice
not be followed.20 5 This approach requires clear proof of the existence of a trade
usage, but also gives full effect to the parties' actual intentions or expectations
concerning the usage.
The approach developed above avoids the problems of the total negation
test 20 6 because it gives effect to express terms by which the parties actually in-
tended to vary or negate trade usage. In Carter Baron Drilling v. Badger Oil
Corp. ,207 for example, the clause "operator shall pay contractor" might have
been an unusual term, inserted purely to reflect an agreement to change the
normal practice. The total negation test diverted the court from evaluating
whether the express term and the trade usage normally coexisted, yet such an
evaluation is crucial in determining the parties' expectations.
20 8
In addition, the interpretive approach outlined in this Article avoids the
problems posed by a restrictive interpretation of section 1-205(4)209 because it
allows a written term to control only if it was actually agreed upon and if the
commercial effect of the term is to negate the trade practice. As this approach
suggests, the court in General Plumbing & Heating v. American Air Filter Co.
2 10
should have considered whether the printed term providing no guarantee of
shipment on any particular date was actually contemplated and agreed to by the
parties.2 11 If the parties did not actually agree on the term and expect it to vary
the normal practice, the court should have permitted them to follow the trade
practice.
If the term in General Plumbing was agreed on, then the court should have
determined that term's commercial meaning. In particular, the court should
have ascertained whether the trade practice requiring suppliers to deliver in time
for buyers to complete their subcontracts was followed under contracts contain-
ing similar "no guarantee of shipment" clauses. A continuance of the trade
practice in such cases would have indicated that the "no guarantee" term was
not understood to negate the trade practice.
21 2
203. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 172-89 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 71-89 and accompanying text.
207. 581 F. Supp. 592 (D. Colo. 1984); see supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of this case.
208. Cf. Federal Express Corp. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 623 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1980)
(noting that trade usage was followed in transactions in which virtually identical express terms were
used); Carl Wagner & Sons v. Appendagez, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding that
trade practice was followed only when express terms required it).
209. See supra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
210. 696 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text for a discussion
of this case.
211. First the court would have needed to determine if the alleged trade practice actually existed.
See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
212. In Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981), for example,
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Under the analysis advanced in this Article, the court in Gindy Manufac-
turing Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp.213 should have considered directly
whether the parties actually agreed to the "as is" clause in Gindy's standard
form contract.214 If they did not, the "as is" clause was not an express term
under section 1-205(4) and should not have been given priority. Instead, the
trier of fact should have been required to give effect to the trade usage as the
more accurate reflection of the parties' intentions and expectations.
Finally, in Advance Process Supply Co. v. Litton Industries Credit Corp.215
the correct analysis based on principles formulated in this Article would have
consisted of the following inquiries: (1) Was there a trade practice making a
creditor responsible for improper filing of a security interest? (2) Did the parties
actually agree to a term whereby the seller/guarantor warranted that all neces-
sary notices and statements were properly filed? and (3) Did this express term
mean that the trade practice would not be followed and that the creditor would
not be responsible for improper filing?
The court in Advance Process ended its analysis after the second step. The
court looked merely at the "plain meaning" of the express term and held that it
superseded the alleged trade practice.216 This analysis omitted the crucial step
of determining what the express term actually meant to the parties.
It may be that the warranty of filing term in Advance Process meant that the
trade practice would not be followed. If so, the court's conclusion was cor-
rect.217 If, however, such clauses are routinely ignored in practice or are under-
stood to apply only when the seller is the original creditor,218 then the court
erred in concluding, that the express term negated the trade practice. If the
court erred in enforcing the term's "plain meaning," it imposed an obligation on
Advance Process that neither party expected, that was not recognized by the
trade community, and that was not justifiable on any other ground.
The analysis proposed in this Article would allow courts to enforce the
clear purpose of section 1-205: to give full effect to trade usage as a source and
reflection of the shared expectations of those in the trade, while recognizing the
power of individuals to change the normal practices by agreement.
it was significant that the trade practice of price protection was observed under Chevron supply
contracts that contained price terms similar to Shell's. Id. at 772, 784. The court relied heavily on
the practice among aggregate suppliers of Nanakuli, however, and there was no evidence concerning
the price terms in the aggregate contracts. Id. at 779.
213. 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (Law Div. 1970); see supra notes 40-45 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of this case.
214. The affidavits and other evidence submitted in opposition to Gindy's motion for summary
judgment strongly suggested that the parties did not actually agree to the "as is" clause. The clause
was in the fine print of a form contract supplied by the seller, and the buyer swore that he was not
aware of the clause and that such clauses normally are used only in sales of used vehicles. Gindy
Mfg., 111 N.J. Super. at 386-87, 268 A.2d at 347.
215. 745 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of this case.
216" Advance Process, 745 F.2d at 1080.
217. This observation assumes that both parties actually agreed to the term. See supra notes
147-71 and accompanying text.




The doctrinal shift toward trade usage as a primary element in contractual
obligation was heralded by Karl Llewellyn and others as a way to make the law
responsive to the problems and values of the commercial community.2 1 9 Profes-
sor Llewellyn believed that the common law is best when it is molded by judges
who are steeped in the particulars of each dispute and sensitive to the shared
values of the community. 220 Emphasis on trade usage in the interpretation of
commercial contracts reinforces both of these elements: information about trade
usage helps judges to understand the context in which contracts are made, and it
expresses the shared values and expectations of the commercial community.
22 1
Trade usage is thus a key element in a "realistic" interpretation of contracts.
222
Two major criticisms, however, have been leveled against the view that
trade usage should be treated as a primary element in a contractual obliga-
tion.223 The first criticism is that it is anomalous, in this age of the socialization
of contract,224 to treat trade usage as an element of the parties' actual expecta-
tions.22 5 Courts in the nineteenth century, it is argued, justified resort to trade
usage under the guise of implied terms or presumed intentions in order to main-
tain the will theory of contract.226 This theory was consistent with the then-
219. See, eg., 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, §§ 555-556; K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 113, at 330,
363; Honnold, supra note 107, at 508-12; Levie, supra note 3, at 1116-17; Mooney, supra note 2, at
250-53.
220. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 113, at 121-57; W. TWINING, supra note 108, at 215-45;
Casebeer, supra note 2, at 673-76; Llewellyn, On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition, 9 U.
CHI. L.S. RECORD 6 (1960), reprinted in K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 215-29 (1962).
221. "Situation-sense," which Professor Llewellyn identified as the basis for judgment in the
"Grand Style," requires knowledge of communal practices and values. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra
note 113, at 121-57; Rohan, The Common Law Tradition: Situation Sense, Subjectivism or "Just-
Result Jurisprudence"?, 32 FORDHAM L. REv. 51, 57-60 (1963) (observing that Llewellyn's "situa-
tion-sense" is closely tied to commercial practices and customs).
222. Numerous other writers have argued for an expansive use of trade usage as a way to make
the law responsive to the concerns and values of contracting parties. See, eg., J. HuRST, LAW AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-
1915, at 290-91 (1964); L. TRAKMAN, supra note 129; Furnish, supra note 3; Kirst, supra note 3.
223. In addition to the two critiques discussed in the text, see Williams, supra note 117. Profes-
sor Williams argues that trade usages either do not exist or are too vague to provide a basis for
decision. The first part of this claim is peculiar. That the market is characterized by competing
interests does not necessarily mean that common practices and expectations do not exist. The few
empirical studies available indicate that trade usages do exist, confirming the testimony of expert
witnesses in numerous cases. See, eg., Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Prelimi-
nary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business
Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 237 (1952).
224. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-103 (1974); F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1118 (2d ed. 1970).
225. For variations of this argument, see P. ATIYAH, supra note 13, at 182; L. FRIEDMAN,
CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 249 n.69 (1965); M. HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 188-201; Gabel &
Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 172, 180 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
226. M. HoRwITZ, supra note 13, at 188-201; see also Gray, The Ages of Classical Contract Law
(Book Review), 90 YALE L.J. 216 (1980) (observing that the device of imputed intention furthered
"a judicial vision of a world ruled by private decisionmaking and the price mechanism").
The "will theory" of contract holds that all contractual obligations are the result of individual
will, governed by only minimal external regulation. See M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
92-95 (1933 & photo reprint 1982); M. HORWrrZ, supra note 13, at 173-88; F. KESSLER & G.
GILMORE, supra note 224, at 2-6; Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 575 (1943). For an eloquent modern statement of the theory, see C. FRIED, supra note 19.
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dominant ideology of laissez-faire economics and individualism. 2 27 In the twen-
tieth century, however, regulation and intervention by the state are thought to
be acceptable and desirable,228 and contract law frankly admits of numerous
areas in which the rights and obligations of contracting parties are determined
by external authorities.229 Because of this change in contract theory, some com-
mentators argue that it is no longer necessary to treat trade usage as a part of the
parties' expectations23 0 and that trade usage should instead be viewed as an ex-
ternal source of law.
23 1
Although provocative, this critique oversimplifies the communal character
of trade usage and overlooks a fundamental innovation in section 1-205.232
Although section 1-205 employs the language of individualism, including such
key terms as expectation and agreement, 233 it envisions actors and activity in a
way profoundly different from the individualistic model of contract. Under sec-
tion 1-205, parties are formed by their experiences in a community. They define
their rights and obligations according to relationships that transcend particular
contracts and that exist as complex social institutions. 23 4 The "individual will"
227. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 13, at 4-5; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 225, at 20-22; M. Hon-
wrrz, supra note 13, at 173-88; Gabel & Feinman, supra note 225, at 175-78. The complex ways in
which contract law was influenced by these political and economic theories is explored in P.
ATIYAH, supra note 19, at 219-568.
228. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 19, at 571-779; F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 224, at
9-12; see also Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook (Book Review), 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 876, 876-95 (1979) (discussing the development of modem contract theory).
229. As Professors Kessler and Gilmore observed, modern contract law includes both legislative
controls, such as statutes governing labor relations or consumer protection, and judicial controls,
such as the doctrines of unconscionability, good faith, promissory estoppel, and the like. See G.
GILMORE, supra note 224, at 55-84; F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 224, at 1-14, 1118.
Some legal commentators, noting the decline in laissez-faire economics and the increase in vari-
ous forms of social regulation, suggest that individualism is no longer a prevalent ideology. See, eg.,
P. ATIYAH, supra note 19, at 627-31; Gabel & Feinman, supra note 225, at 178-81. Yet a recent
study of American values demonstrates how the powerful grip of individualism and relativism con-
tinues to dominate American thought. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S.
TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985)
[hereinafter cited as INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT]; see also Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1717 (1976) ("[T]he rhetoric of individualism so
thoroughly dominates legal discourse at present that it is difficult even to identify a counter-ethic.").
230. These critics generally do not question the assumption that parties expect to follow trade
usage. But see Williams, supra note 117 (arguing that trade usages do not exist). The critics argue
instead that it is difficult to determine actual expectations and that actual expectations are ultimately
irrelevant, because gaps in the parties' expectations should be filled by trade usage, to the extent that
it is fair and reasonable. See, eg., P. ATIYAH, supra note 13, at 176-83; Farnsworth, supra note 13,
at 876-78.
231. See, eg., P. ATIYAH, supra note 13, at 182 (The incorporation of trade customs "is usually
done under the guise of an implied term, but it is in truth simply a rule of law that parties must
perform their contracts in conformity with relevant customs and usages.").
232. This Article, including the discussion that follows, consists of doctrinal analysis. Such anal-
ysis is worthwhile, because how we think about the world affects what world we live in, and legal
doctrine affects how we think about the world. Doctrinal debate often engages genuine moral con-
cern, and the results of such debate define the character of our society in significant ways. Thus, I
part company with many in the ever-growing Critical Legal Studies movement, but I am grateful to
them for an engagement on first principles. See generally Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Criti-
cal Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984) (listing publications of scholars associated with the
Critical Legal Studies movement).
233. See, ag., U.C.C. §§ 1-205(2)-(4) (1978).
234. In this sense § 1-205 is consistent with Professor Macneil's theory of relational contract
law. See, eg., I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Macneil, Value in Contract: In-
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of such actors is a social product, unique in its particular needs and desires, but
fundamentally constituted according to communal norms. 235 Unlike the actors
in an individualistic model,236 the parties envisioned by section 1-205 usually
wish neither to invent wholly new relationships nor to quibble over the smaller
details of their obligations. It is not that these actors are munificent or selfless,
but merely that they operate in a world defined largely by their trade community
and that they willingly accept the normal obligations attendant upon their roles
within that community.
In some trades, sellers are expected to give buyers advance notice of price
increases,237 or to repair any defects in goods delivered, 238 or to deliver goods
in time for their subsequent use by buyers.2 39 In some trades, it is understood
that buyers will not reject nonconforming goods unless they are totally use-
less 24° or that buyers will pay for goods prior to delivery.24 1 Because individual
buyers and sellers accept numerous obligations such as these, they are indeed
formed by the community in which they function. Because section 1-205 recog-
nizes this communal element in human character, it acknowledges the inevitably
public nature of contract law.
Although the first criticism of the primacy of trade usage may be dismissed
for its failure to take account of complexities in the Code's conception of trade
usage, the second major criticism of section 1-205 is not so easily quieted. In an
important article exploring the jurisprudence of the Code, Professor Danzig
charged that the Code uncritically accepts the morality of the marketplace. 242
ternal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 340 (1983). Professor Macneil is overly pessimistic in his
assessment of relational principles in the Uniform Commercial Code. See, eg., I. MACNEIL, supra,
at 72-77. Professor Macneil's conclusion that "[tihe gap-filling rules of the UCC, the common law,
and equity are far more rigid than the principles businessmen normally apply to each other when
difficulties arise," id. at 73-74, does not give adequate consideration to the role of § 1-205.
235. See generally J. DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 63 (1922) ("The problem of
social psychology is not how either individual or collective mind forms social groups and customs,
but how different customs, established interacting arrangements, form and nurture different
minds."); E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 350 n.16 (Free Press 1933)
("[A]lthough society may be nothing without individuals, each of them is much more a product of
society than he is its maker."); G. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY (1934) (exploring the develop-
ment of individual mind and consciousness as a function of social experience).
236. In classical contract law, parties were viewed as "individual economic units which in the-
ory, enjoyed complete mobility and freedom of decision." L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 225, at 21; see
P. ATIYAH, supra note 19, at 260-63; G. GILMORE, supra note 224, at 6-7, 94-95.
237. See, eg., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Corp., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).
238. See, eg., Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d
345 (Law Div. 1970).
239. See, e.g., General Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. American Air Filter Co., 696 F.2d 375 (5th
Cir. 1983); Warren's Kiddie Shoppe, Inc. v. Casual Slacks, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 578, 171 S.E.2d 643
(1969).
240. :ee, eg., Urbana Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Shock, 351 N.W.2d 88 (N.D. 1984); cf.
Sunbury Textile Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1978) (recognizing trade usage
that buyer may cancel only if the first installment does not meet his or her needs).
241. See, eg., Cooper Alloy Corp. v. E.B.V. Sys., 111 R.I. 756, 306 A.2d 837 (1973).
242. Danzig, supra note 2, at 627-31. As Professor Danzig noted, the allegation that the Code is
indifferent to moral content echoes a recurring criticism of legal realism. Id. at 627; see, eg., Fuller,
American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429 (1934); Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About
Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240 (1934); Verdun-Jones, The Jurisprudence of Karl Llewellyn, I DALHOU-
SIE L.J. 441 (1974); cf. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
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Danzig noted that although the Code raises ethical concerns, it directs courts to
rely on the accepted beliefs and practices of a community in ascertaining ethical
values. He observed: "The premise appears to be that values have an objectively
ascertainable existence and a near universal acceptance and thus can be judi-
cially discovered just as a 'reasonable price' can be ascertained by reference to a
market. '243 The problem with this approach, Professor Danzig argued, is that
the Code does not provide any standard by which the moral worth of trade
practices can be judged.244 Although the official comment to section 1-205 indi-
cates that trade usage must be "decent" and "reasonable" to be binding,245 the
Code does not define these standards: "The presumption appears to be that
what is 'commercially decent'.. . will be self-evident to one who carefully stud-
ies the situation.
'246
Rejecting the presumption that community ethical values are somehow self-
evident, Professor Danzig concluded that the Code provides no way to judge the
moral worth of trade practices beyond the subjective values of judges or the
individual interests of the parties involved. In Danzig's view, without a legiti-
mate legislative choice between competing values,247 the Code's moral content is
confined either to the morals of the marketplace or to the individual preferences
L. REv. 485 (1967) (criticizing § 2-302 of the Code). But see Casebeer, supra note 2 (arguing that
Llewellyn's conception of law rests on the unification of fact and value).
According to Danzig, Professor Llewellyn's insistence that legal realism should put first things
first deferred and ultimately precluded a consideration of moral choices. Danzig, supra note 2, at
631 (Danzig quotes Llewellyn's admission in the preface to his casebook: "[Tihe book errs, I think,
in too happily assuming the needs of buyers and sellers to be the needs of the community, and in
rarely reaching beyond business practice in evaluation of legal rules." K. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES at xv n.3 (1930)).
243. Danzig, supra note 2, at 629.
244. Id. at 622-27.
245. U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 5 (1978) ("[flull recognition is thus available. . . for usages cur-
rently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut corners
do not agree"); id. comment 6 ("The policy of this Act controlling explicit unconscionable contracts
and clauses. . . applies to implicit clauses which rest on usages of trade and carries forward the
policy underlying the ancient requirement that a custom or usage must be 'reasonable.' "); cf. Hawk-
land, supra note 12, at 202 (arguing that trade usage must be reasonable to be binding under § I-
205); Murray, Philosophy of Article 2, supra note 2, at 19-20 (arguing that the Code empowers courts
to reject trade practices they find unfair, inequitable, or unjust); Patterson, supra note 8, at 850-51
(the Code includes the requirement that trade usages be reasonable); Llewellyn, Book Review, supra
note 141, at 704 ("The background of trade practice gives a first indication; the line of authority
rejecting unreasonable practice offers the needed correctiv6.").
246. Danzig, supra note 2, at 629.
247. Danzig agreed with the view of Professors Hart and Sacks that the evaluation of trade
usages involves policy choices that should be made by legislatures:
These thinkers [Hart and Sacks] reason from the premise that there is no self-evidently
right answer to an ethical question. From this they infer that the resolution of such ques-
tions requires choice, and to them choice ought, whenever feasible, to be made in a self-
conscious, visible way by those sensitive to the majority's validation or repudiation of their
choices through the electoral process: that is, by legislators.
Id. at 630. As Danzig noted, Llewellyn's views on the institutional roles of the legislature and the
judiciary were not articulated as a fully developed theory. Id. at 624 n. 10. It is clear, however, that
Llewellyn believed that the law must be found, not in legislated policy, but in exploration of the
"fact-pattern of common life," and that courts are best equipped to articulate the law. See generally
K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 113, at 122, 121-57, 256-398 (Professor Llewellyn's views on the nature
of law and the judicial function); Casebeer, supra note 2 (examining Llewellyn's conception of the
unification of fact and value).
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of judges or litigants.
248
Professor Danzig's criticism identifies an undeniable shortcoming of section
1-205. The Code strongly suggests that some moral critique of trade usage is
necessary, 249 but it neither explains why such a critique is appropriate nor de-
fines explicitly the standards to be applied. What the Code does, however, is
recognize the inescapable role of the community in the agreements of individual
actors. The conception of trade usages as communal norms suggests that a
moral critique of trade usages is appropriate, and it provides a direction for
developing criteria by which to evaluate trade usage.
Professor Danzig too easily dismissed the role that the Code's commitment
to communal norms can play in a moral inquiry. If trade usages operate as
communal norms, then the value of a trade usage can be determined by the
quality of the community it helps to create. To recognize our communal charac-
ter is to recognize the diversity of the communities that form us and to acknowl-
edge the possibility of communities formed by exploitation, racism, slavery,
greed, and the like. Bad communities may create bad characters, 25 0 and en-
forcement of the common expectations of such characters may make bad law.
What is needed, here as elsewhere,2 51 is a language of communal value: terms
and concepts that can equip courts to consider the quality of communities.
Although section 1-205 does not itself provide such a language, it does open
an avenue for moral discussion, and it provides a starting point from which to
generate a moral critique of trade usage. Although such a critique is beyond the
scope of the Article, this Article has demonstrated that section 1-205 can be
defended as a skillfully crafted innovation. The application of section 1-205 re-
quires care and deliberation by the courts, but if properly interpreted, this provi-
sion can significantly enrich the intellectual equipment available in commercial
law.
248. Danzig, supra note 2, at 630. See generally M. HoRwrrz, supra note 13, at 190-96 (trade
usage reflects the values of those with market power); Mensch, The History ofl ainstream Legal
Thought, in THE POLrICS OF LAW 18, 34 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) ("Without standards of reasonable-
ness outside existing practice, singing reason is simply ratification of the status quo. .. ").
249. See authorities cited supra note 242. The question whether trade usage is subject to ethical
standards has arisen repeatedly in the law of trade usage. Both before and after the Code, courts
have held that trade usages must be "reasonable," see, eg., Gravenhorst v. Zimmerman, 236 N.Y.
22, 139 N.E. 766 (1923) (unreasonable usage of bankers to delay transmission of money when new
currency was inflating); Fuller v. Robinson, 86 N.Y. 306 (1881) (practice of tobacco brokers in
falsifying credit standing of buyers not reasonable); "moral," see, eg., Jones v. West Side Buick Auto
Co., 231 Mo. App. 187, 93 S.W.2d 1083 (1936) (usages of used car dealers in turning back speedom-
eters were deceptive and contrary to public good); "fair," see, eg., Albert v. R.P. Farnsworth & Co.,
176 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949) (trade usage binding subcontractor but not general contractor would
not be enforced); Steel & Wire Corp. v. Thyssen, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 892 (E.D.
Mich. 1976) (trade usage imposed by dominant buyer unfair); or "efficient," see, e.g., Western In-
dus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (alleged trade usage
limiting consequential damages may be efficient).
250. See generally J. DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1935) (suggesting an impor-
tant connection between communal and individual character); A. DE TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA (G. Lawrence trans. 1966) (1st ed. Paris 1835) (exploring the relationship between
communal norms and individual character); INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT, supra note 229
(studying the effect of communal norms on individual character).
251. Cf. INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT, supra note 229 (suggesting the need for a lan-
guage of communal value).
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